Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons
War Crimes Memoranda

War Crimes

2005

Can terrorist acts be considered crimes against humanity or war
crimes?
Bradley Olson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/war_crimes_memos
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Olson, Bradley, "Can terrorist acts be considered crimes against humanity or war crimes?" (2005). War
Crimes Memoranda. 153.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/war_crimes_memos/153

This Memo is brought to you for free and open access by the War Crimes at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in War Crimes Memoranda by an authorized
administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES RESEARCH LAB

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

ISSUES:
CAN TERRORIST ACTS BE CONSIDERED CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY OR WAR
CRIMES?

Prepared by Bradley Olson
Fall 2005

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................................... v
I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS............................................ 1
A.

Issues .................................................................................................................................. 1
1. Whether the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction to hear cases on
terrorist acts as a war crime ................................................................................................ 1
2. Whether the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction to hear cases on
terrorist acts as a crime against humanity ......................................................................... 2

B.

Summary of Conclusions.................................................................................................. 2
1.

War Crimes ................................................................................................................... 2
(a)
Terrorist Acts Committed By State Actors Violate The Laws Of Armed
Conflict And Constitute a War Crime Under The Rome Statute. ............................... 3
(b)
Terrorist Acts Committed By Non-State Actors Are Not War Crimes If the
Terrorist Organization Operates From Multiple Fronts and Carries Out Attacks
Internationally................................................................................................................... 5
(c)
Terrorist Acts Committed By “Freedom Fighters” and Non-State Actors
Operating and Carrying Out Attacks In One Location May Be Tried By the ICC As
War Criminals................................................................................................................... 5

2.

Crimes Against Humanity............................................................................................ 5
(a)
Terrorist Acts Committed By State Actors Constitute Crimes Against
Humanity And Therefore Fall Within The Jurisdiction Of The ICC.......................... 6
(b)
Some Terrorist Acts Committed By Non-State Actors Amount To Crimes
Against Humanity Because The Elements Of Article 7 Of the Rome Statute Is
Satisfied.............................................................................................................................. 8

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND............................................................................................. 10
A.

Introduction..................................................................................................................... 10

B.

History of Terrorism....................................................................................................... 12

C.

Defining Terrorism ......................................................................................................... 15

i

1. The International Criminal Court’s failure to adopt a definition of terrorism and
include the specific crime of terrorism in the Court’s jurisdiction will not prevent the
court from hearing cases on widespread and systematic acts carried out by terrorist
organizations. However, it will prevent the Court from hearing some cases on
terrorist acts carried out by individual actors because these acts may not amount to a
widespread and systematic attack. .................................................................................... 15
(a)
(i)

Difficulty Defining Terrorism............................................................................ 16
International Conventions and Attempts to Define Terrorism ...................... 16

(b)

Terrorism: The Peacetime Equivalent of a War Crime.................................. 19

(c)

Terrorist versus Freedom Fighter..................................................................... 20

(d)

Similarities in Existing Definitions .................................................................... 23

(e)

Importance of Arriving at an International Consensus .................................. 24

2.

Types of terrorists ....................................................................................................... 26
(a)

State Terrorism ................................................................................................... 26

(b)

Non-State Actors ................................................................................................. 28

(i)

Nationalist ............................................................................................................ 28

(ii) Religious ............................................................................................................... 29
(iii) Left Wing .............................................................................................................. 29
(iv) Right Wing............................................................................................................ 30
III. LEGAL DISCUSSION ....................................................................................................... 30
A.

War Crimes ..................................................................................................................... 31
1.

Applicability of Article 8 of the Rome Statute to State Terrorism................. 35
(a) Was there an armed conflict during the executions? ...................................... 37
(b) Is there a relationship between the armed conflict and the actions in
question? ...................................................................................................................... 37
(c) Was there a violation of the laws of war? ......................................................... 38

ii

2.

Applicability of Article 8 to Non-State Actors..................................................... 39
(a) Armed conflict with terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and others similarly
situated is not an international conflict under the Rome Statute .............................. 40
(b) Attacks such as 9/11 are not internal conflicts under the Geneva Convention,
and therefore, the ICC may not exercise jurisdiction over them under its internal
conflict powers.............................................................................................................. 41
(c) Applying the definition “Terrorism: The peacetime equivalent of a war crime”
has too many identified problems that prevent it from being an effective alternative
to the ICC’s war crimes jurisdiction. .......................................................................... 46

3.
Freedom Fighters and internal terrorist organizations may be the exception to
the general rule that terrorist organizations cannot be tried as war criminals. ............ 48
(a) Is there an ongoing armed conflict recognized by international law? ........... 49
(b) Is there a relationship between the armed conflict and the attack?............... 50
(c) Was there a violation of the laws of war? ......................................................... 50
B.

Crimes Against Humanity.............................................................................................. 51
1.

Applicability of Article 7 To Terrorist Acts Carried Out By State Actors ........... 53
(a)
Saddam Hussein’s Attack Against the Kurdish Community is an Example of
A Terrorist Act Committed By a State That Constitutes A Crime Against
Humanity. ........................................................................................................................ 53
(i) Was there an attack? ............................................................................................ 53
(ii) Were the Acts of the Iraqi Government Part of the Attack?............................ 54
(iii) Was the Attack Directed Against Any Civilian Population? ........................... 54
(iv) Were the Attacks Widespread and Systematic? ............................................... 55
(v) Did Saddam Hussein Have the Requisite Mens Rea? ...................................... 56

2.

Applicability of Article 7 to Non-State actors .......................................................... 57
(a)

Was there an attack? .......................................................................................... 58

(b)

Were the acts of the perpetrators part of the attack? ..................................... 58

iii

(c)

Were the attacks directed against a civilian population?................................ 59

(d)

Were the attacks widespread and systematic?................................................. 60

(e)

Did the perpetrators have the requisite mens rea? .......................................... 60

IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 61

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Legislation
1.

G.A. Res. 109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess. (2000).

2.

Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; August 12, 1949
Art. 2 (1949).

3.

Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; August 12, 1949
Art. 3 (1949).

4.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/99_corr/2.htm.

5.

U.N. SCOR S/Res/1368 (2001).

Treatises and Books
6.

M.CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS
(2001).

7.

YVES BEIGBEDER, JUDGING WAR CRIMINALS (1999).

8.

JASON BURKE, AL-QAEDA: CASTING A SHADOW OF TERROR (2003).

9.

Michael Byers, Terror and the Future of International Law, in WORLDS IN COLLISION:
TERROR AND THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL ORDER (2002).

10. ANTONIO CASSESSE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2003).
11. Anthony Dworkin, Military Necessity and Due Process: The Place of Human Rights in

the War on Terror, in NEW WARS, NEW LAWS? APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR IN 21ST
CENTURY CONFLICTS (2005).
12. WALTER LAQUEUR, NO END TO WAR: TERRORISM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

(2003).
13. William K. Lietzau, Combating Terrorism: the Consequences of Moving From Law

Enforcement To War, in NEW WARS, NEW LAWS? APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR IN 21ST
CENTURY CONFLICTS (2005).
14. Ved P. Nanda, Terrorism, International Law and International Organizations, in LAW IN
THE WAR ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

(2005).

15. PAUST, BASSIOUNI, WILLIAMS, SCHARF, GURULE, AND ZAGARIS, INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIAL (1996).

v

16. ALEX P. SCHMID, POLITICAL TERRORISM: A RESEARCH GUIDE TO CONCEPTS, THEORIES,

DATA BASE AND LITERATURE (1983).
17. LYAL S. SUNGA, THE EMERGING SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:

DEVELOPMENTS IN CODIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION (1997).
18. DAVID WIPPMAN, Introduction: Do New Wars Call For New Laws, in NEW WARS,

NEW LAWS? (2003).
Journals and Law Review Articles
19. Mohamed Elewa Badar, From the Nuremburg Statute to the Rome Statute: Defining the
Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, 5 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 73 (2004).
20. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism: A Policy-Oriented

Assessment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 83 (2002).
21. Simon Chesterman, An Altogether Different Order: Defining the Elements of Crimes

Against Humanity, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 307 (2000).
22. Jennifer Elsea, Terrorism and the Law of War: Trying Terrorists as War Criminals

Before Military Commissions, CRS REP. FOR CONGRESS (2001).
23. Loik S. Henderson, Superior Responsibility, NEW ENG. SCH. OF L. INT'L WAR CRIMES

PROJECT RWANDA GENOCIDE PROSECUTION (April 2000).
24. Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enhancing the Status of Non-State Actors Through a Global War

on Terror?, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 435 (2005).
25. Noelle Quenivet, The World After September 11: Has It Really Changed?, 16 EUR. J.

INT'L L. 561 (2005).
26. Darryl Robinson, Defining "Crimes Against Humanity" at the Rome Conference, 93 AM.

J. INT'L L. 43 (1999).
27. Michael P. Scharf, Defining Terrorism as the Peacetime Equivalent of War Crimes:

Problems and Prospects, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 359 (2004).
28. Pratheep Sevanthinathan, Did the Executions of Baghdad Merchants in July of 1992

Amount to Any Crimes Within the Jurisdicition of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, CASE W.
RES. WAR CRIMES LAB (2005).
29. Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, International Law, and the Use of Military Force, 18

WIS. INT'L L.J. 145 (2000).
Miscellaneous/Websites

vi

30. Al Qaida (sic), Source Watch, at

http://www.sourcewatch.org/wiki/phtml?title=Al_Qaeda.
31. Mary Jo Anderson, Global Court Puts U.S. in Tough Spot, WorldNetDaily, at

http://www.wnd.com/news/article/asp?ARTICLE_ID=24811.
32. Mark Burgess, Terrorism: A Brief History of Terrorism, Center for Defense Information,

at http://www.cdi.org.
33. Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President,

and William J. Haynes, General Counsel of the Department of Defense (Jan 22, 2002),
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/012202bybee.pdf.
34. Case Study: The Anfal Campaign (Iraqi Kurdistan), 1988, at

http://http://www.gendercide.org/case_anfal.html.
35. Council on Foreign Relations, Types of Terrorism, Terrorism: Question and Answers, at

http://www.terrorismanswers.org/terrorism/types.html.
36. Russell Covey, The Need For Clarity in Assessing the Terrorist Acts: Why the Acts May

or May Not Constitute War, Crimes and War Crimes, and Why Definitions Matter,
Findlaw, at http://www.writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20010925_covey.html
(September 25, 2001).
37. Crimes Against Humanity: The 9-11 Bombings are not Acts of War; The 9-11 Bombings
are Crimes Against Humanity, at http://www.ratville.org/ratville/CAH..
38. Definitions of Terrorism, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime at

http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitons.html
39. Boaz Ganor, Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom

Fighter?, at http://http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm.
40. Boaz Ganor, Terrorism: No Prohibition Without Definition, at

http://ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=393.
41. Richard J. Goldstone and Janine Simpson, Evaluating the Role of the International

Criminal Court as a Legal Response to Terrorism, Harvard Human Rights Journal, at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hrj/iss16-/goldstone.shtml.
42. Christine M. Gosden, The 1988 Chemical Weapons Attack on Halabja, Iraq,

TerrorismCentral.com, at
http://www.terrorismcentral.com/Library/Teasers/ChemIraq.html..

vii

43. David Greenberg, Is Terrorism New?, History News Network, at

http://historynewsnetwork.org/articles-/article.html?id=289.
44. Halabja Poison Gas Attack Facts and Information, at

http://www.palfacts.com/Halabja_poison_gas_attack.
45. History Of Terrorism, at

http://www.terrorismfiles.org/encyclopaedia/history_of_terrorism.html.
46. International Criminal Court, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, at

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Criminal_Court.
47. Interview by The People with Irune Aguirrezabal, European Coordinator of the NGO

Coalition for the International Criminal Court.
48. Iran-Iraq War, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran-

Iraq_War.
49. David Johnson and Borgna Brunner, Timeline of Key Events in Chechnya, 1830-2004,

infoplease, at http://www.infoplease.com/spot/chechnyatime1.htm.
50. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, at

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khalid_Shaikh_Mohammed.
51. Snir Kodesh, The Definition of Terror in the Eyes of Radical Islamic Leaders, The

Institute for Counter-Terrorism, at
http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=523.
52. Kalliopi K. Koufa, Terrorism and Human Rights, United Nations Economic and Social

Council, at http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord2001/documentation/commission/e-cn4-sub22001-31.htm.
53. Left-Wing terrorism, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, at

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Left-wing_terrorism.
54. List of terrorist incidents, Brainy Encyclopedia, at

http://www.brainyencyclopedia.com/encyclopedia/1/li/list_of_terrorist_incidents.html.
55. Moscow theater hostage crisis, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, at

http://en.wikipedia.org-/wiki/Moscow_Theatre_Siege.
56. Nationalist Terrorism, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, at

http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index/php?title=Nationalist_terrorism.

viii

57. Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal and

in the Judgment of the Tribunal, United Nations: International Law Commission, at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/nurnberg.htm.
58. Religious Terrorism, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, at

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religious_terrorism.
59. Right-wing terrorism, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, at

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rightwing_terrorism.
60. Adam Roberts, The Changing Faces of Terrorism, at

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/sept_11/changing_faces_01.shtml.
61. Adib Samara, International Adjudicationa and International Terrorism, University for

Peace: Peace and Conflict, at
http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=290.
62. Soliman M. Santos Jr. Wanted: A legal definition of terrorism, at http://i-p-

o.org/terrorism-legal-definition.htm.
63. Robert Scheer, Backing Gonzales Is Backing Torture, The Nation, at

http://www.thenation.comdoc/20050110/scheer0104.
64. September 11, 2001 attacks, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/9/11.
65. R. Jeffrey Smith, Slim Legal Grounds for Torture Memos: Most Scholars Reject Broad

View of Executive's Power, washingtonpost.com, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A26431-2004Jul3.html.
66. State Terrorism, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, at

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_terrorism.
67. Terrorism, Conk Encyclopedia, at

http://www.conk.com/search/encyclopedia.cgi?q=Terrorism.
68. Timeline of Terrorism, at http://www.simplytaty.com/broadenpages/terrorism.htm.
69. Evan J. Wallach, The Logical Nexus Between The Decision To Deny Application of The

Third Geneva Convention To The Taliban and al Qaeda, and the Mistreatment of
Prisoners in Abu Ghraib, at http://lawofwar.org/logical_nexus_between_the_decisi.htm.
70. What is Terrorims, September 11 Attacks: Background and Aftermath, at

http://www.askasia.org.teachers/Instructional_Resources/FEATURES/AmericasCrisis/B
G1/ whatisterrorism.htm.

ix

71. Worse than a War: "Disappearances" in Chechnya -- A Crime Against Humanity, Human

Rights Watch, at hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/chechnya0305 (March 2005).
72. John Yoo & Robert J. Delahunty, Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and

Taliban Detainees, Newsweek National News, at
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/5025040/site/newsweek (last visited November 18, 2005).

x

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issues 1
This memo discusses the ability of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter “ICC”)
to exercise jurisdiction over terrorist acts as war crimes or crimes against humanity. This memo
separates terrorist acts between state and non-state actors. Crimes committed by Saddam
Hussein against the Kurdish population during his reign in Iraq will be used to demonstrate the
applicability of the Rome Statute to State terrorists. The September 11, 2001 attacks directed
against the United States will be used to demonstrate the applicability of the Rome Statute to
non-state actors. Although the ICC would not be able to exercise jurisdiction over these cases
because they occurred before the Court came into legal existence, they clearly demonstrate the
power granted to the ICC under the Rome Statute. Furthermore, these attacks also have had
substantial influence on the approach taken by the international community in its attempt to
combat terrorism which will be identified in the accompanying text throughout the memo.
1. Whether the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction to hear cases on
terrorist acts as a war crime 2
The ICC clearly has authority to prosecute leaders of a state for war crimes when they
authorize the use of terrorist force against a civilian population. 3 In 1988, Saddam Hussein
committed a terrorist attack in violation of the laws of war when he ordered the poison gas attack
on the village of Halabja during the Iraq-Iran conflict. This crime and other similar attacks
1

Issue: The ICC will have jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Please discuss
whether terrorist acts can be considered crimes against humanity or war crimes. (Note that there is no specific
terrorist act for which information is being sought. Terrorist acts analyzed infra were selected randomly, based on
the severity and recency of the attacks, and the impact they have had on the war on terrorism.)

2

For purposes of this memo, it will be assumed the jurisdictional element under Article 13 of the Rome Statute is
satisfied.

3

Even though the international community has failed to conclusively define “state terrorism”, the jurisdiction of the
ICC will not be affected. The ICC has the ability to prosecute any government in violation of the enumerated crimes
listed in the Rome Statute. However, the crimes identified as acts of state terrorism will be used to demonstrate the
different treatment of state and non-state actors under the statute.

1

committed by state governments constitute violations of Article 8 of the Rome Statute, and the
ICC will have jurisdiction to hear these cases.
However, the ICC may not have jurisdiction over terrorist acts being tried as war crimes
when carried out by non-state actors operating from multiple locations. The September 11
attacks changed the international outlook on the threat of terrorism; yet the international
community has failed to fully address the legal responses available to combat terrorism. This
memorandum will identify the shortfalls of Article 8 as applicable to terrorist attacks committed
by non-state actors operating from multiple locations.
Conversely, the ICC may have the ability to prosecute non-state terrorists groups under
Article 8 of the Rome Statute, whether labeled “terrorists” or “freedom fighters,” when these
groups commit acts within the confines of one nation during a recognized armed conflict. The
conflict between Russia and Chechen rebels will be used to illustrate an ongoing internal conflict
involving internal groups whose acts can be prosecuted under Article 8.
2. Whether the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction to hear cases on
terrorist acts as a crime against humanity
The ICC has jurisdiction to hear some cases involving terrorist acts if the actors are being
charged with crimes against humanity, regardless of the label given to the actor carrying out the
attack. However, the jurisdiction of the ICC, under current law, will be limited in scope as to
which terrorist acts may be heard. Only those acts that satisfy all of the elements under Article 7
will fall within the authority of the ICC. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the ICC over a terrorist act
is dependent on the extent of the attack.
B. Summary of Conclusions
1. War Crimes

2

Article 8 of the Rome Statute confers jurisdiction upon the ICC to hear cases involving
inhumane acts that occur during an armed conflict. In determining whether a war crime exists, a
two-part factual inquiry is first necessary to: (1) determine whether there was an ongoing armed
conflict at the time of the inhumane acts; and (2) establish whether a link exists between the
inhumane acts and the armed conflict. 4 Once it has been determined that a nexus exists, it is
then necessary to determine if any of the enumerated crimes listed under Article 8 of the Rome
Statute have been committed. If a violation exists, the final inquiry requires analysis of the
perpetrators mens rea in carrying out the offense. If all of the above factors are established, all
persons involved in the act(s) may be tried for war crimes.
(a) Terrorist Acts Committed By State Actors Violate The Laws Of Armed
Conflict And Constitute a War Crime Under The Rome Statute.
Generally, State terrorism involves “the use or threat of violence by the state or its agents
or supporters, particularly against civilian individuals and populations, as a means of political
intimidation and control (i.e. a means of repression).” 5 Therefore, any nation-state committing
terrorist acts against a civilian population during an armed conflict constitutes grave breaches of
the Geneva Convention and the ICC will have the ability to prosecute the actors for war crimes.
An example of a state terrorist act prosecutable under the Rome Statute occurred during the Iraq-

4

Pratheep Sevanthinathan, Did the Executions of Baghdad Merchants in July of 1992 Amount to Any Crimes Within
the Jurisdicition of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, CASE W. RES. WAR CRIMES LAB, 2005, at 4 [hereinafter
Sevanthinathan] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 49].

5

State Terrorism, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_terrorism (last visited
September 3, 2005) (quoting JEFFREY A SLUKA, DEATH SQUAD: THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF STATE TERROR (2000))
(However, further note that the definition of state terrorism, like terrorism generally, is disputed internationally.)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 4].

3

Iran War 6 when Saddam Hussein employed the use of chemical weapons to target a Kurdish
village and killed hundreds of people. 7
In applying the requirements of Article 8, the first inquiry is whether a war was going on
at the time of the terrorist act. This element is clearly established in the case above because there
was a declared war between two States. 8 Next, it must be determined whether there is a link
between the armed conflict and the terrorist acts. Again, this element is satisfied because
Saddam Hussein authorized the use of any chemical weapons at his military’s disposal in an
attempt to secure a victory in the war and suppress the support Iran was receiving from Iraqi
Kurds.
To enable the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction over a perpetrator for war crimes, there
must be (1) a grave breach of the Geneva Convention; 9 (2) other serious violations of laws and
customs of applicable international armed conflict; 10 or (3) violations of article 3 of the Geneva
Convention during an internal conflict. 11 In this situation, Saddam violated several of the
enumerated acts. One such violation occurred under Article 8(b)(iv), which identifies an
intentional military strike carried out with the knowledge that such an attack will cause incidental
loss of life or injury to civilians or serious, long-term damage to the environment as a violation
6

The ICC would not have jurisdiction over this crime due to the absence of retroactive jurisdiction. However, this
crime carried out by Saddam Hussein’s regime is an example of the type of crime that rises to the level of state
terrorism and is prosecutable under the Rome Statute. For other examples of State terrorism, see id.
7

See Christine M. Gosden, The 1988 Chemical Weapons Attack on Halabja, Iraq, TerrorismCentral.com, at
http://www.terrorismcentral.com/Library/Teasers/ChemIraq.html (last visited September 30, 2005 (noting that ten
years after the attack, the long term effects were still unknown) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].

8

See Iran-Iraq War, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran-Iraq_War (last visited
October 22, 2005) [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 50].
9

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(a), at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/99_corr/2.htm.
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1].
10

Id. Art. (8)(b)

11

Id. Art. (8)(c)

4

of the laws of war. In the Iraq-Iran war, Saddam’s use of chemical weapons clearly violates this
enumerated act, and therefore would constitute a war crime under the Rome Statute.
(b) Terrorist Acts Committed By Non-State Actors Are Not War Crimes If the
Terrorist Organization Operates From Multiple Fronts and Carries Out
Attacks Internationally.
Although the 9/11 attacks constitute several enumerated crimes listed under the Geneva
Convention, and the requisite mens rea exists for the top al Qaeda leaders, the ICC would not
have the ability to try those actors as war criminals because an armed conflict was not ongoing at
the time of the execution. 12 Moreover, even though the international community has declared a
“war on terror” following the 9/11 attacks, the ICC will not have the ability to exercise
jurisdiction over “terrorist” actors carrying out similar attacks because this is not a war
recognized by international law. 13 Therefore, members of non-state terrorist organizations will
not be held accountable for war crimes under existing international law.
(c) Terrorist Acts Committed By “Freedom Fighters” and Non-State Actors
Operating and Carrying Out Attacks In One Location May Be Tried By the
ICC As War Criminals.
Terrorist acts carried out by “Freedom Fighters” during an internal conflict can violate
the laws of war and therefore the actors may be tried as war criminals. The reason that these
groups will be treated differently than other non-state organizations is that international law
recognizes this type of conflict. 14 Therefore, attacks carried out by non-state actors during an
internal conflict that are in violation of the laws of war can be tried as war crimes by the ICC.
2. Crimes Against Humanity
12

Also because the ICC Statute did not enter into force until July 2002 (upon the 60th ratification).

13

There are two types of armed conflict recognized under the Geneva Conventions: international and conflicts not of
international character. See War Crimes analysis discussed infra section III(A)(1) and (2).
14

See Geneva Conventions Art 2 and 3; See also discussion of applicability of Article 8 of the Rome Statute to
“Freedom Fighters” discussed infra section III(A)(3).

5

Article 7 of the Rome Statute grants the ICC jurisdiction to hear crimes against humanity.
This statute does not distinguish between state and non-state perpetrators. 15 Therefore, any
person committing these crimes can be haled into court and tried under the jurisdiction of the
ICC when the elements are established. For an act to amount to a crime against humanity, the
following elements must be present: (1) there must be an attack; (2) the acts of the perpetrator
must be part of the attack; (3) the attack must be directed against any civilian population; (4) the
attack must be widespread or systematic; and (5) the perpetrator must know that the acts
constitute part of a pattern of widespread or systematic crimes. 16 Applying these factors to
terrorist acts, it is clear that some attacks committed by state and non-state actors amount to
crimes against humanity.
(a) Terrorist Acts Committed By State Actors Constitute Crimes Against
Humanity And Therefore Fall Within The Jurisdiction Of The ICC.
A nation-state carrying out terrorist attacks that violate Article 7 of the Rome Statute
clearly falls within the jurisdiction of the ICC. A government leader who indiscriminately targets
and kills members of their state or citizens of another during a strategic operation has committed
a crime against humanity. An example of an attack carried out by a nation-state that can be
described as a terrorist attack and in violation of international human rights laws is the Anfal
campaign carried out by Saddam Hussein’s regime. 17 In 1988, Saddam Hussein launched an
15

See id. Art. 7(2)(a) which states: “(a)ttack directed against any civilian population means a course of conduct
involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or
in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack.” (emphasis added).
16

See Mohamed Elewa Badar, From the Nuremburg Statute to the Rome Statute: Defining the Elements of Crimes
Against Humanity, 5 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 73 (2004) [hereinafter Badar] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 51].
17

Although these attacks occurred before the entry into force of the ICC and cannot be heard under ICC jurisdiction,
they clearly illustrate a “terrorist attack” carried out by a nation-state that can be prosecuted as a crime against
humanity. These crimes have also been classified as genocidal, but this is beyond the scope of this paper and will
not be discussed in detail.

6

attack against Kurdish communities located throughout Iraq. As a result of these attacks, more
than one thousand Kurdish villages were eliminated, and in excess of one hundred thousand
Kurds were killed. Applying the elements of Article 7, it is clear that these attacks constitute
crimes against humanity.
Addressing the first element, that there must be an attack directed at a civilian population,
this crime may be classified not only as a murder but rather as an extermination of a population.
Furthermore, the regime also employed the use of forced disappearances and imprisonment. 18
Under Article 7, all of the foregoing acts constitute an attack. Thus, the first element is satisfied.
The second element, that the acts of the perpetrator be part of the attack, is also satisfied. The
extermination of these civilians was done under the orders of Saddam Hussein and carried out by
members of his regime. The orders and planning of the attack are as much a part of the attack as
the assault itself. Therefore, Saddam’s orders were part of the attack as was the execution of the
orders. Thus, all government officials involved in the attack satisfy the second element. The
third element requires the attacks to be directed against the civilian population. This element is
also satisfied. Saddam was not only targeting those who he believed to be uprising against his
authority, but rather he indiscriminately carried out the attacks, killing thousands of women and
children. 19 Therefore, these attacks clearly were attacks on the civilian population.
The attacks can also be labeled as widespread and systematic, thereby satisfying the
fourth element. The mass casualties and total destruction of thousands of Kurdish villages
demonstrate that these attacks were widespread. The preconceived plan devised by Saddam and
executed by his regime show that these attacks were systematic.

18

See Case Study: The Anfal Campaign (Iraqi Kurdistan), 1988, at http://www.gendercide.org/case_anfal.html.
(last visited September 15, 2005) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 6].
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See id.
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The final element, that Saddam and the members of his regime had the requisite mens rea
is clearly satisfied as well. Saddam felt his rule was being threatened by the Kurds and, in
response, he authorized these devastating and inhumane attacks. Thus, the attacks against the
Kurdish community committed by Saddam Hussein and his proxies violate Article 7 of the Rome
Statute, and the ICC would have jurisdiction over these crimes. Consequently, any government
organization carrying out these types of terrorist attacks upon its population or the population of
another country would violate Article 7 and may be tried for such crimes by the ICC.
(b) Some Terrorist Acts Committed By Non-State Actors Amount To Crimes
Against Humanity Because The Elements Of Article 7 Of the Rome Statute Is
Satisfied.
Although the ICC delegates failed to reach an agreement as to a definition of terrorism,
the Court will be able to exercise its jurisdiction over some acts when the elements of Article 7
are established. Unlike the analysis for war crimes, it is unnecessary to differentiate between
non-state actors operating at an international level and those acting during an internal conflict. 20
Thus, if a terrorist organization commits an act that violates Article 7 of the Rome Statute, the
ICC has jurisdiction. However, without a definition of terrorism, not all acts will be included.
The attacks carried out on September 11, 2001 21 by members of the al Qaeda
organization violate Article 7 of the Rome Statute and those persons involved in acts of this type

20

The reason that this distinction need not be made is the fact that crimes against humanity may occur during
peacetime as well as during an armed conflict. The determination of whether the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent
“war on terror” is a war recognized by international law is irrelevant. Therefore, crimes against humanity will apply
to terrorist acts that fulfill the requirements under Article 7 of the Rome Statute, regardless of whether they are
carried out by state actors or non-state actors.
21

Although September 11 attacks are being used as an example, these terrorist attacks cannot be heard by the ICC
because it does not have retroactive jurisdiction, nor is the United States a signatory of the Rome Statute and the
requirements of Article 13 will not be satisfied. However, the recency of 9/11 allows for a clearer understanding in
determining the ability of the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over terrorist acts.
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could be tried for these violations. Applying the elements necessary to prosecute persons for
crimes against humanity, it is clear that the 9/11 attacks constitute such a violation.
The first element, that an attack must have occurred, is easily satisfied because the deaths
of an estimated 3,000 people as a result of the attack can be classified as a murder, the first
enumerated act constituting an attack under Article 7. The second element requires that the acts
of the perpetrator be part of the attack. Although the men who carried out the attacks died during
its execution, those leaders of the organization who ordered the attacks constitute part of the
attack. Under the doctrine of superior responsibility, “liability for subordinate criminal conduct
can exist despite the absence of any direct or affirmative action taken by a superior.” 22 Although
the leadership structure of al Qaeda may be unorthodox as compared to military structures, it
seems that the doctrine of superior responsibility would apply to those members creating the
plans of attack and giving the orders. 23 The third element, that the attacks be directed towards
the civilian population is easily satisfied because the structures that were attacked were used for
civilian employment. 24 The fourth requirement, that the attacks be widespread and systematic is
satisfied as well. The thousands of people murdered at four different locations qualify the
attacks as widespread. Furthermore, the existence of a preconceived plan to carry out a
methodical attack on several different facilities establishes that these attacks were systematic in

22

Loik S. Henderson, Superior Responsibility, NEW ENG. SCH. OF L. INT'L WAR CRIMES PROJECT RWANDA
GENOCIDE PROSECUTION, April 2000, at 1, 4 [hereinafter Henderson] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 65].
23

The applicability of the doctrine of superior responsibility to terrorist organizations may raise many issues that are
beyond the scope of this paper and will not be addressed in detail. But see JASON BURKE, AL-QAEDA: CASTING A
SHADOW OF TERROR 16 (2003) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 45] (noting that “Bin Laden does not
have the power to issue orders that are instantly obeyed. He is not the commander-in-chief of an army.”)
24

The Pentagon may be a unique exception to being classified as a military installation because of the large amount
of non-military employees. However, a terrorist attack on a building or installation being primarily comprised of
military members, even though some non-military employees are assigned there, would be classified as a military
installation and would not constitute an attack on the civilian population.
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nature. The final element, the requisite mens rea, is satisfied because the leaders of the al Qaeda
organization were “declaring war” against the United States and had the intent to commit such a
devastating act. 25 All that is required to be shown for the mens rea is that the perpetrator of a
crime against humanity had the intent to commit the underlying offense and knowledge that the
offense is part of a larger policy or crime. 26 Consequently, the acts committed on 9/11 and future
acts similar in nature carried out by non-state actors constitute the enumerated crimes listed
under the statute. Therefore, those persons carrying out such an attack may be prosecuted for
crimes against humanity.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Introduction
September 11, 2001 brought shock to the international community. The world’s sole
remaining “superpower” was victimized; its symbols of military and financial powers lay
smoldering and pictures of horror filled the news. Approximately 3,000 people were killed. 27
Thousands more were injured. Terrorism was now catapulted to the forefront of the
International agenda.

25

Russell Covey, The Need For Clarity in Assessing the Terrorist Acts: Why the Acts May or May Not Constitute
War, Crimes and War Crimes, and Why Definitions Matter, Findlaw, at
http://www.writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20010925_covey.html (September 25, 2001) (noting that “Osama
bin Laden declared war on America several years ago. In a 1988 edict, bin laden proclaimed that ‘To kill Americans
and their allies – civilian and military – is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in
which it is possible to do.’”) [hereinafter Covey] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39]
26

See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW at 82 (2003) [hereinafter CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 53].
27

VED P. NANDA, Terrorism, International Law and International Organizations, in LAW IN THE WAR ON
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM at 1 (2005) [hereinafter NANDA]. (78 different countries lost citizens due to the
attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and United Airlines flight 93) [Reproduced in accompanying
Notebook at Tab 52].
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President Bush’s administration recognized the need for global cooperation to combat
terrorism. 28 In response, the United States sponsored resolutions which were adopted by the
United Nations Security Council 29 and the General Assembly 30 on September 12, 2001. These
resolutions stressed the need for “all states to work together” to show “international cooperation”
to diminish acts of terrorism. 31 The United States took further action to combat terrorism,
declaring a global war against the perpetrators of the attacks. This resulted in the war in
Afghanistan as well as the ongoing conflict in Iraq. The international community has responded
by supporting the “war on terrorism” in a piecemeal fashion. 32 However, this “war” continues
with no end in sight.
Although the United States recognized the need for international cooperation in the “war
on terrorism,” it has also been one of the strongest opponents of the ICC. However, this
opposition may be ill-advised because the ICC may be the strongest weapon to combat terrorism.

28

Prior to this time, it has been argued that the Bush Administration practiced unilateralism, evidenced by its public
rejection of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, they Kyoto Protocol, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court and a protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention. See MICHAEL BYERS, Terror and the Future of
International Law, in WORLDS IN COLLISION: TERROR AND THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL ORDER 118, 118-119
[hereinafter Byers] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 54].
29

See U.N. SCOR S/Res/1368 (2001)

30

See U.N. GAOR A/Res/56/1 (2001)

31

See Richard J. Goldstone & Janine Simpson, Evaluating the Role of the International Criminal Court as a Legal
Response to Terrorism, Harvard Human Rights Journal, at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hrj/iss16/goldstone.shtml. (last visited September 18, 2005) (citing U.N
GAOR, 56th Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., Agenda Item 8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/1 (2001) [hereinafter Goldstone]
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25].

32

Many countries opposed the invasion of Iraq and refused to supply any military support. However, many
countries throughout the world continue to investigate and prosecute suspected terrorist actors, regardless of their
position on the war.
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Furthermore, opposition to the ICC may reduce international support for the U.S.-led war against
terrorism. 33
B. History of Terrorism
The attack of 9/11 was not the beginning of terrorism, nor is it the end. Terrorist
activities have occurred throughout the world for many centuries. 34 In 350 B.C., the Greek
historian Xenophon wrote about the effectiveness of psychological warfare. 35 The ancient
Romans used banishment, expropriation of property, and execution as means to discourage their
enemies. 36 Maximilien Robespierre openly advocated the use of terror during the French
Revolution, resulting in the “justifiable” death of approximately 40,000 people. 37 Although
terrorism is not a new concept, its nature has changed since the first use of the word.
During Robespierre’s “reign of terror,” “terrorism” referred to the type of force used by
the government to impose its radical rule on reluctant citizens. 38 However, the 19th century

33

See Mary Jo Anderson, Global Court Puts U.S. in Tough Spot, WorldNetDaily, at
http://www.wnd.com/news/article/asp?ARTICLE_ID=24811 (last visited September 13, 2005).[Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
34

See Timeline of Terrorism, at http://www.simplytaty.com/broadenpages/terrorism.htm (illustrating terrorist acts
which have occurred world-wide since the 17th Century) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 55]. See
also List of Terrorist Incidents, Brainy Encyclopedia, at
http://www.brainyencyclopedia.com/encyclopedia/1/li/list_of_terrorist_incidents.html. (last visited September 22,
2005) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab37].
35

History of Terrorism, at http://www.terrorismfiles.org/encyclopedia/history_of_terrorism.html (last visited
September 20, 2005) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 56].
36

Id.

37

Id. See also Mark Burgess, Terrorism: A Brief History of Terrorism, Center for Defense Information, at
http://www.cdi.org (last visited September 20, 2005) [hereinafter Burgess] (Explaining that Terrorism was initially
viewed as a positive term quoting Robespierre as stating "Terror is nothing other than justice, prompt, severe,
inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue; it is not so much a special principle as it is a consequence of the
general principle of democracy applied to out country's most urgent needs.") [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 31].
38

See also Adam Roberts, The Changing Faces of Terrorism, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/sept_11/changing_faces_01.shtml. (last visited September 24, 2005) [hereinafter
Roberts] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].
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introduced the world to a new type of terrorism. Instead of the government inflicting atrocities
upon its own citizens, terrorism was now becoming associated with non-governmental groups. 39
One such group, known as Narodnaya Volya (the people’s will), targeted oppressive Russian
leaders. 40 They believed that the introduction of bombs and bullets allowed them to
discriminately target the leaders of the Tsarist system they were fighting, which they believed to
be “fundamentally rotten,” and that the violence they imposed would spark revolution. 41 This
type of terrorism continued for several decades, with the main objective being the assassination
of political leaders and heads of state.
After World War II, terrorism took on a new face and its focus extended beyond political
leaders. Terrorist movements in English colonies began to appear, usually being associated with
two distinct purposes: 1) to put pressures on the colonial powers to hasten their withdrawal; and
2) to intimidate the indigenous population into supporting a particular group’s claims to
leadership of the emerging post-colonial state. 42 This type of terrorist agenda became the roots
of terrorist movements today.
By the 1950’s and 1960’s terrorist acts began to spread throughout the world, including
South-East Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. Policemen and political leaders were
killed. Civilians were taken hostage. Aircraft were hijacked. Buildings were bombed.

39

Id.

40

Id. (Narodnaya Volya “developed certain ideas that were to become the hallmark of subsequent terrorism in many
countries.”)

41

Id. (The violent acts of the Narodnaya Volya eventually led to the assassination of Tsar Alexander on March 13,
1881 but eventually failed to have the revolutionary effects they desired ).

42

Id. (Professor Roberts notes that these acts were somewhat successful, but illustrates that achievement of
independence in places such as India was the result of nonviolent leaders and not terrorist acts.)
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Terrorism was no longer solely focused on revolutionary socialist and nationalist ideology, but
now included religious motivation. 43
The terrorist evolution was not complete. Throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s, more
ideologically motivated terrorist groups began to appear. These groups adopted methods to carry
out attacks that would be publicized internationally. 44 In the 1990’s Osama bin Laden and his
radical Islamic movement known as “al-Qaeda” revolutionized what is now known as
terrorism. 45 The group was comprised of many revolutionaries who helped free Afghanistan
from Soviet occupation in the 1980’s. However, al-Qaeda had a new agenda following the
Afghanistan revolution. Bin Laden and his leaders adopted their predecessors’ use of the media
and began making public statements, “expressing discontent for existing Arab regimes, hostility
to U.S. dominance, and insensitivity to the effects of terrorist actions.” 46 The world was now
exposed to a new threat of terrorism, one which had never been realized throughout history. No
longer was terrorism confined to one state. Al-Qaeda became a network of extremists
throughout the world who would inflict despondency on their enemies by any means, to include
suicide bombings. 47 This is the terrorism the world faces today.
Although there have been radical changes throughout history on what can be classified as
a terrorist act, several similarities remain:
•

43

Terrorism usually has an unofficial character, claiming to be the result of an upsurge of
public feeling.

Id.

44

Burgess, supra note 37 (Referencing to Palestinian groups pioneering the hijacking of aircraft and the group
"Black September" seizure and murder of 11 Israeli athletes).

45

See BURKE, supra note 23 (providing a detailed historical account of the development of the al-Qaida network).

46

Roberts, supra note 38.

47

But see BURKE, supra note 23, at 7-22 (illustrating that the “global reach” of al Qaeda is overstated).
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•
•
•
•

Terrorism is based on a naïve belief that a few acts of violence, often against symbolic targets
representing the power of the adversary, will transform the political landscape in a beneficial
way.
Terrorism has become increasingly involved in attacking innocent civilians, often with the
purpose of demonstrating that the state is incapable of protecting its own people.
Terrorists generally underestimate the strong revulsion of ordinary people to acts of political
violence.
The tendency of terrorism to become endemic in particular countries and regions. 48

C. Defining Terrorism
1. The International Criminal Court’s failure to adopt a definition of terrorism
and include the specific crime of terrorism in the Court’s jurisdiction will not
prevent the court from hearing cases on widespread and systematic acts carried
out by terrorist organizations. However, it will prevent the Court from hearing
some cases on terrorist acts carried out by individual actors because these acts
may not amount to a widespread and systematic attack.
In 1994, the International Law Commission (“ILC”) proposed a Draft Statute for the ICC,
which included a list of crimes known as “treaty crimes.” 49 Included within these crimes was
the act of terrorism. However, the Preparatory Committee believed that all crimes under the
Rome Statute should be defined rather than listed as had been done by the ILC. 50 Accordingly,
the committee ultimately opted to eliminate terrorism from the statute because of inability to
agree on a definition. 51 Nevertheless, this will not prevent the ICC from handling the most
heinous acts of terrorism. Even though there is no generally agreed upon definition and no
specific crime under the Rome Statute granting the ICC jurisdiction over crimes of terrorism, the
Court may nonetheless exercise jurisdiction if the act amounts to another crime which is under
its jurisdiction.

48

Roberts, supra note 38.

49

See Goldstone supra note 31 at 14. Treaty crimes were offenses punishable under various treaties, including
terrorism, drug trafficking, apartheid, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.

50

Id.

51

Id.
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(a) Difficulty Defining Terrorism
As the history of terrorism demonstrates, scholars are able to identify a terrorist act ex
post facto. Conversely, defining terrorism has become a riddle without an answer. 52 There has
been public debate throughout the international community between leaders and scholars as to
the complicated task of creating such a definition. Most definitions are idiosyncratic, turning on
either the social or political views of the speaker. One author stated: “[t]he question of definition
of a term like terrorism cannot be detached from the question of who is the defining agency.” 53
(i) International Conventions and Attempts to Define Terrorism
The first attempt to create an international definition of terrorism came in 1937 in
response to the international outcry over the assassinations of Yugoslavian King Alexander and
French Minister M. Barthou at Marseilles. 54 The League of Nations defined the term as “all
criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the
minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public.” However, this
definition failed to obtain sufficient ratifications and never was adopted and the international
community was left without a definition.
Since that time, it has been argued that the international community has haphazardly
attempted to define terrorism, only doing so in a piecemeal fashion rather than

52

See ALEX P. SCHMID, POLITICAL TERRORISM: A RESEARCH GUIDE TO CONCEPTS, THEORIES, DATA BASE AND
LITERATURE Pinpoint Page (1983) [hereinafter SCHMID] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5]
(illustrating that 109 definitions have been introduced between 1936 and 1981); See also Soliman M. Santos Jr.,
Wanted: A Legal Definition of Terrorism, at http://i-p-o.org/terrorism-legal-definition.htm. [hereinafter Santos]
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab19] (noting that there have been more definitions since Schmid’s
research, including at least six from the United States government alone).
53

SCHMID, supra note 52 at 6.

54

See LYAL S. SUNGA, THE EMERGING SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: DEVELOPMENTS IN
CODIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 195 (1997) [hereinafter SUNGA] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 7].
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comprehensively. 55 Many scholars take this position because the international community has
opted to define acts of terrorism in response to current threats or occurrences instead of taking a
forward looking approach and creating a conclusive definition proscribing all acts of terrorism.
As a result of this approach, the international community has adopted seventeen conventions
directly relating to the suppression, control or prevention of terrorism. 56 These conventions deal
with specific acts of “terrorism” including: “hijacking of civil aircraft; sabotage of civil aircraft
and navigation facilities; attacks on international airports; attacks on internationally protected
persons and kidnapping of diplomats; the taking of hostages; attacks on civil maritime targets
and on fixed platforms on the continental shelf; the financing of terrorist activity; and the use of
bombing and explosive devices against civilian installations and persons.” 57 These conventions

55

See Kalliopi K. Koufa, Terrorism and Human Rights, United Nations Economic and Social Council, at
http://www.hri.ca.fortherecord2001/documentation/commission/ecn4-sub2-2001-31.htm. (last visited September 27,
2005) [hereinafter Koufa] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 57].
56

These conventions include: Convention on the High Seas (U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/L. 52-55 or 52 & 56 &58
(1958)); Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (opened for signature Sept.
14, 1963, 704 U.N.T.S 219); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1970, 860 U.N.T.S 105); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation (opened for signature Sept. 23, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 177); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (opened for signature Dec. 14,
1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167); International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (U.N. Doc. A/Res/34/146
(1979); Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (IAEA Doc. IFCIRC/225 (Mar. 3, 1980));
Convention on the Law of the Sea (U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/122 or 13/51 & 45 (1982)); Protocol for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation (ICAO Doc. 9518 (Feb. 24, 1988));
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (IMO Doc.
Sua/Conf/15.Rev.1 (1988)); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms
Located on the Continental Shelf (IMO Doc. Sua/Conf/16/Rev.2 (1988)); Convention on the Marking of Plastic
Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (S/22393 & Corr.1 (Mar. 1, 1991)); Convention on the Safety of United
Nations and Associated Personnel (U.N. Doc. A/49/742 (1994)); International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorism Bombings (U.N. Doc. A/Res/52/164 (1998)); International Convention for the Suppression of Financing
Terrorism (G.A. Res. 109, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 54 Sess., 76th Meeting, Agenda Item 160, U.N. Doc A/54/109
(1999)); Draft Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (U.N. Doc. A/C.6/53/L.4 (1998)); and
the Draft Convention on International Terrorism (Working Document Submitted by India, U.N. Doc A/.6/55/1 (Aug.
28, 2000). See M.CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS at 3-4 (2001)
[hereinafter BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM] Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 45].
57

Id.
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are directed toward states, encouraging them to adopt domestic laws to suppress terrorist
activities.
Prior to 1987, however, none of the conventions mentioned, much less defined,
“terrorism.” 58 Furthermore, these conventions do not define “innocent civilians” or
“diplomats,” 59 nor do they encompass all persons and infrastructures targeted by terrorist
organizations today. 60 However, these conventions demonstrate that the international
community condemns egregious acts committed by terrorist organizations directed at civilian
targets.
In 1987, in an effort to better combat terrorism, the United Nations (U.N.) assigned the
Sixth Legal Committee the responsibility of drafting a definition of terrorism. However, the
Committee failed to reach a conclusive term, and, in response, the General Assembly established
an ad hoc committee to establish a framework for combating terrorism. 61 This committee is
responsible for the creation of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism, which defined terrorism as:
(1) “[a]n act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined in
one of the treaties listed in the annex; or
(2) [a]ny other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian,
or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation
of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to
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See Michael P. Scharf, Defining Terrorism as the Peacetime Equivalent of War Crimes: Problems and Prospects,
36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 359, 360 (2004) [hereinafter Scharf]. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
9].
59

See BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 56.

60

For example, the bombing of the US Naval Ship USS Cole on October 12, 2000 would not be covered under the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. See 27 I.L.M 668 (10
Mar. 1988) Art. 2(1)(a) and 2(1)(b) (“This Convention does not apply to: (a) a warship; or (b) a ship owned or
operated by a State when being used as a naval auxiliary or for customs or police purposes).
61

Scharf, supra note 58 at 360.
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intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.” 62

However, there is no indication that this definition ever received formal adoption to serve
as the international definition, as evidenced by the continued difficulty in reaching an
agreement.
Following the September 11 attacks, a new effort arose in the United Nations to develop
a comprehensive strategy to combat terrorism. Again, a generally agreed upon definition was
almost reached. However, Malaysia, on behalf of the 56-member Organization of the Islamic
Conference, stressed the need to separate freedom fighters from terrorists and proposed
additional language to the definition excluding these actors from the overarching definition of
terrorism. 63 When the member states could not settle the dispute, the project stalled and the
international community was again left with no definition. 64
(b) Terrorism: The Peacetime Equivalent of a War Crime
Alex P. Schmid, a terrorism scholar and expert, has attempted to assist the U.N. and the
international community in reaching a consensus definition. In 1992, Schmid proposed a simple
definition that classified terrorism as the peacetime equivalent of a war crime. 65 However, this
proposal was largely ignored until the India Supreme Court explicitly referred to it in April of
62

Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism [Terrorism Financing], U.N. Doc. A/54/109 (9 Dec.
1999); see also Scharf, supra note 58 at 360 (Noting that this is the closest the international community has ever
come to reaching a consensus on a definition.)
63

Scharf, supra note 58 at 361 (The proposed addition to the definition used the following language: “Peoples’
struggle including armed struggle against foreign occupation, aggression, colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at
liberation and self-determination in accordance with the principles of international law shall not be considered a
terrorist crime.”)

64

Id.; for a detailed explanation of international attempts to define terrorism, see PAUST, BASSIOUNI, WILLIAMS,
SCHARF, GURULE, AND ZAGARIS, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIAL (1996) [hereinafter
PAUST, ] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 20].
65

For a detailed explanation of what constitutes a war crime under international law, see the War Crimes section
below.
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2004 in the case of Singh v. Bihar. 66 Since this reference, the definition has gained more
recognition.
This definition proposed by Mr. Schmid, although simple, is very comprehensive.
Applying this term under the Rome Statute, for an act to rise to the level of terrorism it must: (1)
occur during peacetime and (2) violate one of the enumerated crimes under Article 8. Utilizing
this definition seems to include not only acts directed towards the civilian population, but also
terrorist acts directed at military personnel as well. Therefore, terrorist acts aimed at a nation’s
military would be covered under the definition and prosecutable under international law.
However, there has been some concern as to the consequences of implementing this
definition in the international law arena because of the unclear treatment of those considered
“freedom fighters” during civil wars. 67 Additionally, one author argues that such a definition
would mean that perpetrators of an attempt to kill a postwar dictator would have to be tried as
war criminals, calling this an “implausible proposition.” 68 Consequently, this definition has not
been internationally accepted.
(c) Terrorist versus Freedom Fighter
The dispute over the definition of terrorism goes beyond the wording. As will be
illustrated, there are several similar existing definitions that can assist the international

66

See Scharf, supra note 58, at 359-60 (citing the India Supreme Court, which stated: “If the core of war-crimes
deliberate attacks on civilians, hostage-taking and the killing of prisoners is extended to peacetime, we could simply
define acts of terrorism veritably as ‘peacetime equivalents of war crimes.’”).
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See What is Terrorism, September 11 Attacks: Background and Aftermath, at
http://www.askasia.org.teachers/Instructional_Resources/FEATURES/AmericasCrisis/BG1/whatisterrorism.htom
(last visited September 24, 2005) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
68

WALTER LAQUEUR, NO END TO WAR: TERRORISM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 234 [hereinafter LAQUEUR]
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24].
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community in reaching a consensus. However, the real dispute arises out of the inability to
determine what groups and what acts should be covered by such a definition.
As previously noted, “One man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter.” This cliché has
defined the position of many Middle Eastern nations and other third world countries. 69 For
example, in 1986, Syrian President Hafez el-Assad, speaking during the 21st Convention of
Workers Unions in Syria, stated: “We have always opposed terrorism. But terrorism is one thing
and a national struggle against occupation is another. We are against terrorism … Nevertheless,
we support the struggle against occupation by national liberation movements.” 70 Similarly, a
resolution drafted during the fifth Islamic summit meeting held in Kuwait in 1987 stated:
The conference reiterates its absolute faith in the need to distinguish the brutal and
unlawful terrorist activities perpetrated by individuals, by groups, or by states, from the
legitimate struggle of oppressed and subjugated nations against foreign occupation of any
kind. This struggle is sanctioned by heavenly law, by human values, and by international
71
conventions.

Further, as noted earlier, the latest attempt to define terrorism was stalled indefinitely when
Malaysia attempted to include language in the definition explicitly excluding “freedom fighters”
from its grasp.
However, western states and their leaders have been much more restrictive in classifying
a freedom fighter as different from a terrorist and have not been receptive to the cliché “one
man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter.” One United States Senator has been quoted as
saying:
69

See Boaz Ganor, Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter, at
http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm (last visited September 18, 2005) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 26]; see also Snir Kodesh, The Definition of Terror in the Eyes of Radical Islamic Leaders, The Institute for
Counter-Terrorism, at http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=523 (last visited September 21, 2005)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22] (explaining the viewpoints of Islamic leaders and the
widespread belief that terrorist acts are necessary in times of political struggles).
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See Ganor supra note 69 (quoting Tishrin, Syria, November 17, 1986).
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See id. (quoting Al-Anba'a, Kuwait, January 30, 1987).
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The idea that one person’s ‘terrorist’ is another’s ‘freedom fighter’ cannot be sanctioned.
Freedom fighters or revolutionaries don’t blow up buses containing non-combatants;
terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don’t set out to capture and slaughter
schoolchildren; terrorist murderers do …. It is a disgrace that democracies would allow
the treasured word of ‘freedom’ to be associated with acts of terrorists. 72

Middle Eastern leaders have been reluctant to drop the distinction and western nations are
hesitant to include such exclusions in the definition. Therefore, before an international definition
of “terrorism” can be reached, an agreement on the definition of “freedom fighter” must first be
established. However, similar to the stalemate with defining terrorism, the definition of
“freedom fighter” turns on the subjective viewpoint of the speaker. Thus, if the speaker agrees
with the movement, the group will be referred to as revolutionaries or freedom fighters whereas
the opponents of such a group will refer to them as terrorists.
However, there are distinct differences that can be identified to separate revolutionary
groups from ideologically motivated groups. Usually revolutionary groups are larger than other
groups and usually are at war with a single regime, seeking to end its rule. These groups are
usually comprised of volunteer fighters who oppose the government, but are generally untrained
and “outgunned” by the government forces. For these reasons, these groups may resort to
unlawful attacks, including the targeting of civilian populations and destruction of private
property which violates international law. 73 Ideological groups, on the other hand, are usually
smaller groups that do not have the capability of ousting a regime. However, the force used by
these groups reveals weaknesses in a government, causing terror within the society because of
the exposure of vulnerability. 74
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See id. (quoting Binyamin Netanyahu, Fighting Terrorism 8 (1995).
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See BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 56, at 85.
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Id.
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Regardless of the term applied to a group, if the act amounts to a crime under current
international law, those actors can be prosecuted by the ICC. 75 The shortfall of such an
approach, however, is that those single acts that do not amount to a crime under international law
will have to be deferred to state courts where the crime took place, irrespective of that nation’s
ability or willingness to bring the actors to justice.
(d) Similarities in Existing Definitions
As previously stated, many similarities in existing definitions can provide a basis to
develop an internationally acceptable definition of the term “terrorism.” Schmid has found the
academic consensus of such a definition to be:
“Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi)
clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons,
whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets.
The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity)
or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message
generators. Threat-and-violence-based communication processes between terrorist
(organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target
(audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention,
depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.” 76

However, this definition is complex and both over and under-inclusive. It has broad sweeping
language covering almost any attack on a civilian population; but like some of its predecessors, it
fails to include acts targeting military personnel or installations. In light of the recent attacks on
military personnel, this definition does not encompass all objectives carried out by terrorist
organizations today. Furthermore, this definition requires the act be of repeated, violent action.
Therefore, single acts of terrorism would not be included.
75

See Santos, supra note 52 (citing one scholar who stated that a comprehensive definition could distinguish
between a terrorist actor and a national liberation movement, but “terrorist methods will be punishable irrespective
of the specific political purpose and irrespective of whether those acts are committed by liberation movements or
regular armies.”)
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Definitions of Terrorism, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, at
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15].
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An analysis of the recurring themes and principles underlying the definition of terrorism
provides a more simplified understanding of the similarities among definitions. Definitions
usually contain some or all of the following elements:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

A terrorist act is generally unlawful.
It is violent and may be life threatening.
The violence is politically motivated.
The direct targets are civilians.
The direct targets may not be the main targets.
The main targets may be one or more nation-states, governments, or societies; or a political,
ethnic, or religious group, or an industry or commercial operation, within those societies.
The objective is usually to intimidate the main targets.
There may or may not be a claim of responsibility.
The perpetrator is usually a non-state. Where there is direct state involvement, the state actors are
clandestine or semi-clandestine forces. 77

Thus, the underlying principles of all definitions of terrorism contain similar elements which can
be used as a basis in creating an internationally acceptable definition. However, given the
difficulty in separating freedom fighters from terrorist organizations, even these similarities may
not lead to an agreement. Therefore, the ICC will have to continue to operate without a
definition until a consensus on this separation can be agreed upon. However, even without an
agreed upon definition and explicit jurisdiction over acts of terrorism, the ICC will be able to
prosecute groups who carry out acts in violation of existing laws.
(e) Importance of Arriving at an International Consensus
Article 17 of the Rome Statute grants the ICC complementary jurisdiction. This means
that the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction only when a nation with primary jurisdiction is
77

Terrorism, Conk Encyclopedia, at http://www.conk.com/search/encyclopedia.cgi?q=Terrorism (last visited
September 21, 2005) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]; see also Ganor, Defining Terrorism, supra
note 69 (Ganor notes that Schmidt and Youngman cited 109 different definitions in their book political terrorism,
but isolated the recurring elements of such definitions finding that (1) violence, force appeared in 83.5% of
definitions, (2) political motivation appeared in 65% of definitions, (3) fear, emphasis on terror appeared in 51% of
definitions, (4) threats appeared in 47% of definitions, (5) psychological effects and anticipated reactions appeared
in 41.5% of definitions, (6) discrepancy between the targets and the victims appeared in 37.5% of definitions, (7)
intentional, planned, systematic, organized action appeared in 32% of definitions, and methods of combat, strategy,
tactics appeared in 30.5% of definitions.).
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unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute the crime at issue. 78 Complementary jurisdiction
is said to have a variety of consequences. 79 One of these concerns is fear that the ICC may
encroach upon a nation’s sovereignty. However, it has been argued that such a fear may provide
a nation with an incentive to incorporate ICC crimes into its own domestic laws, creating more
vigilance in investigating those crimes. 80 Conversely, without an internationally accepted
definition of terrorism and with the ongoing disagreement over “freedom fighters,” a nation may
elect to incorporate the crime of terrorism into its domestic law but distinguishes a “freedom
fighter” from a “terrorist” when doing so. This may create a notion that the ICC is politically
influenced by more powerful nations if it attempts to exercise its jurisdiction over a crime
referred to it, but the nation from which it seeks extradition has a distinction within their law
separating freedom fighters from terrorist members. Thus, a recognized definition under
international law can serve as a protective device for the court and avoid the criticism of political
motivation.
Another important reason for continuing to seek an internationally acceptable definition
is the fact that under current international law, only certain terrorist acts will fall within the
jurisdiction of the ICC. This is because the vast majority of terrorist acts may never amount to a
crime against humanity or war crime under current definitions. An example is the “lone wolf”
terrorist who carries out a terrorist act without the assistance of a private group or nation. 81 In
this situation, it may be hard, if not impossible, to find the act to be widespread or systematic.
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Rome Statute, art. 17 supra note 9.
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See Goldstone supra note 31.
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Id at 21.
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An example of such a crime that would not fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC is the Oklahoma City bombing
carried out by “US Domestic Terrorists” Timothy McVeigh with the assistance of Terry Nichols. It has been noted
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Moreover, as one author has pointed out, “without an objective and authoritative
definition, accepted by all nations, the fight against terrorism will always suffer from ‘cultural
relativism.’” 82 Therefore, to be a legitimate force in the fight against terrorism and avoid the
label of being politically motivated or influenced, the ICC must establish a definition acceptable
to all parties so all terrorist acts fall within the Court’s jurisdiction. 83
2. Types of terrorists
The “war on terror” is a misnomer. Although terrorism in general is a strategy used to
instill fear in a particular segment of society to achieve a goal, 84 different organizations operate
for different purposes. However, the “war on terror” identifies only those groups, such as alQaeda, who have been connected with the 9/11 attacks. To properly evaluate the role of the ICC
and its jurisdiction over acts of terrorism, it is necessary to identify the different types of terrorist
groups. 85
(a) State Terrorism
State terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism are distinguishable. State-sponsored
terrorists operate independent of any state order, but rather the state may nevertheless support the

that the motivation for the attack was the discontent McVeigh had towards the US government. However, it would
not satisfy the elements required under Article 7 of the ICC and similar acts would escape jurisdiction.
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Boaz Ganor, Terrorism: No Prohibition Without Definition, available at
http://ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=393 [hereinafter Ganor, No Prohibition Without Definition]
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18].
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See Adib Samara, International Adjudication and International Terrorism, University for Peace: Peace and
Conflict, at http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=290 (last visited September 21, 2005)
[hereinafter Samara] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 16].
84

M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism: A Policy-Oriented Assessment, 43 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 83, 84 (2002) [hereinafter Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism] [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 3].
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In this section I will provide a general description of the differing types of terrorist movements. Because each is
unique in its own sense and can be the topic of a separate paper on its own, it is outside the scope of this paper to
illustrate in detail the differing methods of terrorism.
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activity by providing a safe haven either overtly or covertly. 86 In contrast, state terrorism occurs
when a government or its proxies use unnecessary force against its citizens or citizens of another
state. 87 Moreover, the goals of state terrorism and state-sponsored terrorists are distinguishable.
The goals of a state utilizing terrorist activity usually include the suppression of certain
populations or the protection of an existing government whereas state-sponsored terrorist groups
usually seek the demise of a nation’s government while operating with the overt or covert
support of a state. 88
However, state terrorism remains a hotly debated issue amongst scholars and the
international community. 89 State terrorism, like terrorism generally, is a term not recognized by
international law. 90 Scholars have proposed definitions based on their position as to what
constitutes state terrorism. One terrorism scholar suggested that terrorism be separated into four
categories: (1) terrorist acts committed during armed conflicts; (2) terrorist acts perpetrated
usually on foreign soil by state agents outside the framework of an armed conflict; (3) acts
involving the state in the activities of terrorist groups; and (4) internal state terrorism. 91
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Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism supra note 84, at 84.
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Id; see also State Terrorism, supra note 5.
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Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism, supra note 84, at 85.
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For example, those that oppose the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq call the attack a terrorist act. However, those who
support the war believe it to be legitimate. Similarly, the acts of other countries, such as Russia’s use of force
against Chechnya and Israel’s use of force against Palestine, have been hotly debated issues with those opposing
calling them acts of terrorism while those favoring force find them legitimate.
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Noelle Quenivet, The World After September 11: Has It Really Changed?, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 561, 565 (2005)
[hereinafter Quenivet, ] [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 66].
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However, this has not been universally accepted and other scholars have presented differing
ideas. 92
Governments that utilize terror upon their citizens usually do so by unfair trials, terror
bombing, and extrajudicial executions. 93 These acts are in violation of international human
rights laws, and the actors of these crimes fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction.
(b) Non-State Actors
Non-state actors can be identified as either revolutionaries or insurgents or as
ideologically motivated groups. Difficulties of defining terrorism arise because the person
defining the term may lump several terrorist groups under the same umbrella term. However,
terrorist organizations are distinct from one another because of different aims and goals. This
distinction has created the problem of separating “freedom fighters” and terrorist organizations.
Following are classifications of non-state terrorist organizations.
(i) Nationalist 94
Nationalist terrorists are groups seeking to create an independent state. The motives of
revolutionary terrorist groups are their beliefs that they are fighting imperialist governments.
Nationalist terrorists have been more successful in gaining international support than other
terrorist groups because they convey a message that they are fighting for “national liberation that
they believe the world has ignored.” 95 Because of this support, it is a highly contentious debate
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Id.. (Hirschman, a terrorism scholar, believes it should be a more political categorization, distinguishing between
terrorism supported by a state and terrorism tolerated by a state).
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State Terrorism, supra note 5.

94

For a comprehensive list of groups classified as “nationalist” terrorists, see Nationalist Terrorism, Wikipedia, the
free encyclopedia, at http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index/php?title=Nationalist_terrorism (last visited October 8, 2005)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 13].
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Council on Foreign Relations, Types of Terrorism, Terrorism: Questions and Answers, at
http://www.terrorismanswers.org/terrorism/types.html [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12].

28

as to whether these groups should be classified as terrorists at all. Supporters of “nationalists”
describe them as “freedom fighters” while those who oppose the movement label them as
terrorists.
(ii) Religious
Religious terrorism refers to the violent force used by a group to further a divine purpose.
This type of terrorism involves multiple religions and spans the entire globe. Many religious
terrorist groups seek to create independent states because of their religious beliefs. 96 These
groups believe that they are carrying out the will of God or another divine being. Most terrorist
groups classified as Religious organizations will usually fall within another classification as
well. 97 An example of a religious terrorist group is the Abu Sayyaf Group (“ASG”). ASG is a
terrorist organization operating in the Southern Philippines and is motivated to create an
independent Islamic State in the Southern Philippines. They have resorted to violence against the
civilian population in an attempt to force the Philippine government to recognize their movement
and acquiesce to their demands. 98 The United States has offered military support to the
Philippine government in support of the “war on terror.” 99
(iii)Left Wing
Left-wing terrorism is the result of violence performed by groups who are proponents of
the political left to achieve their goals through fear. However, most left-wing groups reject the
use of terror tactics and often differentiate between unsupported groups and guerilla struggles.
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Religious Terrorism, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religious_terrorism (last
visited October 18, 2005) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 67].
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For example, al Qaeda is usually classified as a religious organization, but also one with political overtones.
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See Religious Terrorism, supra note 96.
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See id for examples of other Religious terrorist groups.
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The earliest example of a left-wing terrorist group is the Narodniks in Russia during the late 19th
and early 20th Century. Their goals were the overthrow of the Tsarist system in Russia and they
directed their attacks against the Tsar and his ministers. 100 Again, the dispute as to the
classification of members of these groups as terrorists or freedom fighters arises.
(iv) Right Wing
Right-wing terrorist groups usually direct their violence at those they determine to be
threats or enemies of traditional values or the political right. Right wing terrorists’ ideology
tends to be religious, political, or ethno-national superiority. Furthermore, right wing terrorist
groups usually aim to eliminate democratic governments and replace them with fascist states.
The members of these groups are often racist and focus their attacks on immigrants. These types
of terrorist groups can be found throughout the world. Neo-Nazi groups in Germany and the Ku
Klux Klan in the United States have been identified as examples of Right-wing terrorist
groups. 101
Many terrorist groups cannot simply be placed in one category which adequately
describes them but rather can be classified under several of these headings. However, the ICC
jurisdiction will depend not only on the type of terrorist group, but on the act as well. 102
III. LEGAL DISCUSSION
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For examples of other Left Wing Terrorist groups, see Left-Wing terrorism, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Left-wing_terrorism (last visited October 18, 2005) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 68].
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Because many groups may be classified under several headings, in determining the jurisdiction of the ICC,
terrorist groups will be separated into state and non-state actors.
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The International Criminal Court came into legal existence on July 1, 2002 and will serve
as a permanent international tribunal. The jurisdiction of the Court is limited to only the most
heinous crimes. Specifically, Article 5 of the Rome Statute lists these crimes as: 1) genocide; 103
2) crimes against humanity; 3) war crimes; and 4) the crime of aggression. 104 Those countries
that ratified the treaty granted the tribunal the authority to exercise complementary jurisdiction
over its citizens. Any crime that does not fall within the jurisdiction of the court may be tried
only by the national tribunal in which the crime occurred.
Addition of the treaty crimes would have included the crimes of terrorism and drug
trafficking. 105 However, those that opposed the addition of these crimes argued that they were
too difficult to define and that adding such crimes as drug trafficking and terrorism would
“distract from the seriousness of the crimes the court was established to deal with.” 106 Thus,
these crimes were not included in the Rome Statute. Since 9/11 the attitude towards the
seriousness of terrorism has changed significantly; however, the first opportunity to grant the
Court explicit jurisdiction over additional crimes is 2009. 107
A. War Crimes

103

Genocide is a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC, but it is beyond the scope of this paper and will not be
discussed in detail.
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But see Rome Statute Art 5(2) supra note (“The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression
once a provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions
under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with
the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.” Thus, the ICC will not be able to exercise jurisdiction
over a perpetrator committing a crime of aggression until a provision is adopted. The first opportunity to add an
explicit provision is 2009.)
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See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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International Criminal Court, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Criminal_Court (last visited October 8, 2005) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 8].
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See Rome Statute Art 121(1) supra note 9.
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Article 8 of the Rome Statute grants the Tribunal jurisdiction over war crimes.
Generally, a war crime is a punishable offense under International Criminal Law for violating the
laws of war. Specifically, the Rome Statute defines war crimes as: (1) “grave breaches of the
Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949; 108 (2) [o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs
applicable in international armed conflict, within the framework of international law” named in
the statute; 109 (3) attacks on people not taking part in the armed conflict; 110 and (4) [o]ther
serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international
character, within the established framework of international law.” 111 The overarching principle
amongst all these crimes, and the basic element for establishing a war crime, is that the
prohibited act must occur during an armed conflict. 112 However, armed conflict is not a defined
term under the Geneva Convention or the Rome Statute. Usually an armed conflict does not
raise concern because of its obviousness. However, if the existence of a conflict is unclear, it has
been left to the States involved to decide whether an armed conflict exists. 113 If an agreement
cannot be reached as to the existence of an armed conflict, the Court should look to the intensity
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Id. art 8(2)(a).
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Id. at art 8(2)(b).
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Id at art 8(2)(c).
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Id at art 8(2)(e).
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Sevanthinathan, supra note 4, at 31; see also Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enhancing the Status of Non-State Actors
Through a Global War on Terror?, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 435, 452 (2005) [hereinafter O'Connell].
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 27] (stating “The Rome Statute of the [ICC] further supports the
traditional position. Although the Statute includes some provisions that would make terrorist acts criminal directly
under international law, the statute makes clear that no act is a war crime unless it occurs during an armed conflict.).
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See Sevanthinathan supra note 4. (citing M. Gandhi, Common Article 3 of Geneva Conventions, 1949: In the Era
of International Criminal Tribunals, ISILYBIHRL 11).
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of the violence as an indicator. 114 Generally, if the intensity of a conflict is high, it may properly
be labeled an armed conflict. 115
Codes of conduct have always existed limiting the scope of armed conflicts. 116 In the
19th century, the first written body of international law governing wartime operations was
introduced. 117 Since that time, laws of war have continued to develop following major
conflicts. 118 Following the extensive use of mustard gas, aerial warfare, tanks, and machine guns
during World War I, the laws of war underwent substantial revision.119 Similarly, World War II
brought about the adoption of the 1949 Conventions in response to the massive civilian
casualties. 120 During the Gulf War, the world was introduced to the widespread use of precision
guided missiles. Following this war, many questions were raised regarding the adequacy of the
laws “pertaining to the definition of military objectives, the application of the principle of
proportionality, the precautions states must take to avoid expected incidental civilian casualties
when attacking military objectives, and the steps that should be taken to minimize indirect harm
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Id. (citing Hans Peter Gasser, International Humanitarian Law, in Introduction to International Humanitarian
Law (EDS.) M.K. Balachandran, Rose Verghese (1998)
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Id.
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See Anthony Dworkin, Military Necessity and Due Process: The Place of Human Rights in the War on Terror, in
NEW WARS, NEW LAWS? APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR IN 21ST CENTURY CONFLICTS 53, 57 (2005) [hereinafter
Dworkin,] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 43] (noting that “[t]hese laws represented an attempt to
confine organized violence in international affairs within what were seen as the narrowest feasible boundaries.”.
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David Wippman, Introduction: Do New Wars Call For New Laws, in NEW WARS, NEW LAWS? 1, 1-2 (2003)
[Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 41].
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Id. at 2 (noting that the Geneva Conventions of 1929 were designed to improve the treatment of sick and
wounded soldiers and the 1925 Protocol which limited the use of poisonous gas).
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Id. (noting that the earlier Conventions, although protecting civilians, failed to address important issues including
“indiscriminate attacks on civilian populations through aerial bombardments).
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to civilians from the destruction of basic infrastructures.” 121 It has been argued that the Geneva
Conventions provide only “highly elastic” principles to these concerns. 122
The fact that the hostilities engaged in were between two states was the common thread
amongst the foregoing wars. The term “war” was recognized in international law “long before
the formal codifications of the laws of war;” being defined as “a matter between sovereigns only,
and for a legally recognized armed conflict to exist there had to be a hostile contention by means
of armed forces carried on between states.” 123 Under this definition, only states were recognized
as capable of engaging in war. 124 Members of militias or volunteer corps were authorized to
fight, but they had to be “under responsible command, distinguish themselves from civilians,
[carry] their weapons openly, and [observe] the laws and customs of war.” 125 Until 1949, wars
between sovereign nations were the only conflicts recognized by international law. 126 In 1949,
Common Article three recognized “armed conflicts not of international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.” 127 The scope of Article three has been the
cause of debate amongst legal scholars as to whether the international laws of war apply.
The reason for the debate is that the war on terror is different from any conflict the world
has ever seen. Members of terrorist organizations cannot be distinguished from civilians because
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Id. at 3
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Dworkin, supra note 116 at 58 fn 11 (quoting LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
28-29 (2000).
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Id.
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they do not utilize distinct emblems or uniforms 128 nor is the leadership structure always clear. 129
Further, they do not carry their weapons openly in public. No international law which explicitly
recognizes a “war” similar to the “war on terror” has been referenced by those claiming
international law applies to such a conflict. Instead, they argue that existing law should apply
through inference. 130 An international court should reject this theory and wait until the
international community explicitly adopts this position before exercising its jurisdiction over
“combatants” involved in this type of war. However, as of now, this still has not been
accomplished, and the international community is left with an undefined war. Consequently,
most terrorist groups will not be covered by existing international laws of war and these actors
will not be held accountable for war crimes. 131
1. Applicability of Article 8 of the Rome Statute to State Terrorism.
A State’s use of terrorist tactics during an armed conflict clearly violates the laws of war
and the ICC will have jurisdiction to try such a government and its proxies for war crimes. 132
The most notable use of terror by a government during an ongoing war was the Holocaust during
World War II, in which, inter alia, millions of Jews were exterminated. In response, the
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Covey supra note 25.

.
129

See BURKE, supra note 23.
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This will be discussed more thoroughly in accompanying text. See Section III(A)(2) (Applicability of Article 8
of the Rome Statute to Non-State Actors).
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See Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, International Law, and the Use of Military Force, 18 WIS. INT'L L.J. 145,
148 (2000) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 40] (Stating that a strong case exists against states for
violations of international law when a state participates in international terrorism. Travalio finds that this is made
clear by General Assembly Resolution 2625 which states: “Every state has a duty to refrain from organizing,
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organized activities within its territory directed toward the commission of such acts.”); But see Jennifer Elsea,
Terrorism and the Law of War: Trying Terrorists as War Criminals Before Military Commissions, CRS REP. FOR
CONGRESS , (2001) (citing THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 70 (1995)
which states that “states supporting the acts of third parties are not necessarily responsible for those acts merely by
providing financial, political, or intelligence support.”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10].
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Nuremberg tribunal was developed to sentence high level politicians and military leaders for
their responsibilities in these atrocities. 133 These defendants were charged with “(1) killing and
cruel treatment of the civilian population; (2) abduction of the civilian population of occupied
territories into slavery; (3) killing and cruel treatment of prisoners of war; (4) killing of hostages;
(5) imposition of extortionate fines; (6) senseless destruction of towns … unjustified by military
necessity; (7) forced recruitment of manpower; and (8) germanization of occupied territories.” 134
Although these trials have been criticized as “victor’s justice,” the Nuremberg tribunal made
significant contributions to international criminal law. It allowed tensions to be reduced between
the “victors and the vanquished” by substituting a legal process for the victims’ urge for revenge;
it decreased the risk that the entire German population would be assigned collective guilt for the
atrocities; and most importantly, by establishing international individual responsibility for crimes
against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity it established the principle that no one
was free to commit serious violations of international law. 135
Since Nuremburg, there have been other war crimes committed by nation-states that can
be described as terrorist acts. One such example occurred during the Iraq-Iran war and is known
as the Halabja poison gas attack. 136 During this war, Saddam Hussein employed the use of
chemical weapons to indiscriminately attack civilians located in the Kurdish town of Halabja. 137
At the time of the attack, the town was a stronghold of Iranian troops and Kurdish guerillas
133

See YVES BEIGBEDER, JUDGING WAR CRIMINALS 27 (1999) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 36].
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Halabja is located in Iraq approximately 150 miles north of Baghdad and 8-10 miles from the Iranian border. See
Halabja Poison Gas Attack Facts and Information, at http://www.palfacts.com/-Halabja_poison_gas_attack (last
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supporting Tehran. Shortly after the attack, the international community raised no protests,
believing the deaths of the civilian population were collateral due to the “mishandling of the
combat gas.” 138 However, soon after the war concluded, the deaths became described as a
massacre and the Iraqi government was blamed for the occurrence.139
These acts can be described as a terrorist attack because the means (using chemical
weapons) was used to satisfy terrorist ends (instilling fear in the Kurdish population for its
support of Iran). Furthermore, the attack satisfies all the elements necessary for the actors to be
subjected to war crimes violations and provides a useful element-by-element illustration.
(a) Was there an armed conflict during the executions?
The first requirement, which is the underlying principle of war crimes jurisdiction, is that
there must be an ongoing armed conflict. Although the term ‘armed conflict’ is defined neither
under the Rome Statute nor under the Geneva Convention, this element is clearly satisfied. The
Iraq-Iran war was a declared war between the armed forces of both nations.
Under the Geneva Convention, an armed conflict exists if two High Contracting Parties
are engaged in hostilities towards one another. This means that at least two nations must be on
opposing sides and engaged in the hostilities. In this situation, this element is clearly satisfied
because Iraq and Iran are two nations that were opposed to each other’ s position and were
engaged in hostilities towards one another.
(b) Is there a relationship between the armed conflict and the actions in
question?
The next inquiry is to determine whether a nexus exists between the armed conflict and
the attack. This requirement was established by the original international court to exclude crimes
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See id.
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not related to the armed conflict. 140 This requirement has recently been upheld by the ICTY in
Pavo and Zenga in which the court stated: “there must be an obvious link between the criminal
act and the armed conflict.” 141 This language establishes that a simple criminal act taking place
during an armed conflict will not rise to the level necessary to hale the actor into court and try
him/her as a war criminal; the act must necessarily be related to and in furtherance of the
ongoing war. 142
In the Halabja attack, the facts clearly establish that the crime committed was related to
and in furtherance of the conflict with Iran. This attack was directed at villages located near the
Iranian border. Iranian soldiers had a stronghold over some of the villages from which they were
operating. Furthermore, the Kurds were supporting Tehran. Therefore, the facts demonstrate
that this attack was a response by the Iraqi government to suppress the support of the Iranian
government by the Kurdish nationals. Thus, a nexus between the armed conflict and the attack
exists.
(c) Was there a violation of the laws of war?
Once a nexus has been found to exist between the crime and an armed conflict, the next
inquiry is to determine whether a violation of the laws of war has occurred. Under the Rome
Statute, a violation of war occurs when (1) there has been a grave breach of the Geneva
Convention; (2) there is another serious violation of the laws and customs applicable in
international armed conflict; (3) attacks on civilians, or (4) other serious violations of the laws
and customs applicable in armed conflicts during an internal war.
140
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In the Halabja attack, the Iraqi government indiscriminately attacked villages occupied by
Iranian soldiers and Kurdish “freedom fighters” without taking into consideration the lives of the
civilian population. This attack violates several enumerated prohibitions under the Geneva
Convention as well as Article 8 of the Rome Statute. The most obvious crime that occurred
during this conflict is the fact that the attacks were carried out against civilians not taking part in
the conflict. 143 This itself constitutes a violation of the laws of war and, therefore, the ICC
would have jurisdiction to hear these crimes if it had retroactive jurisdiction.
Although the ICC cannot hear these crimes committed by the Iraqi government during
the Halabja attack because it does not have retroactive jurisdiction, it has the ability to hear
similar acts carried out by governments. Therefore, any nation that indiscriminately carries out
attacks on a civilian population during an armed conflict violates the laws of war and the ICC
will have jurisdiction to prosecute high- ranking officials for their participation. This analysis
would encompass most acts of state terrorism because government officials that utilize
unnecessary force against civilian populations to secure power violate international law. These
acts are prohibited under the Geneva Convention, as well as the Rome Statute, and the actors
may be tried by the ICC for these types of attacks.
2. Applicability of Article 8 to Non-State Actors
The ICC may not exercise jurisdiction against non-state actors for war crimes unless
these actors are engaged in a civil war or operating within a single territory. 144 As stated earlier,
to come under ICC jurisdiction the prohibited act must occur during an armed conflict. Under
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Several other violations were committed during these attacks. These include: willful killing, willfully causing
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the Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute an armed conflict may occur in two settings: 1)
internationally or 2) “armed conflict not of international character.”145 Therefore, to determine
whether terrorists involved in an attack may be tried as war criminals, it is necessary to
determine whether an armed conflict exists, internally or internationally.
(a) Armed conflict with terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and others similarly
situated is not an international conflict under the Rome Statute
Under Common Article 2 of the Geneva Convention, an international armed conflict is
defined as “all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two
or more of the High Contracting Parties.” 146 Only states may be High Contracting Parties under
the Convention. Consequently, an international armed conflict can only exist between states. Al
Qaeda is not a state party and, accordingly, cannot be involved in an international armed conflict
as defined by the statute.
To support this contention, even the United States, who has insisted that the 9/11 attacks
constituted an act of war, has conceded that the attacks do not qualify as an international armed
conflict. 147 Some authors contending that the “war on terror” must be recognized by
international law on the grounds that it is covered under Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, not
Article 2. 148 Therefore, the acts that occurred on 9/11, as well as any attack similar in kind,
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See Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J.
Haynes, General Counsel of the Department of Defense (Jan 22, 2002), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/012202bybee.pdf (stating that Article 2 of the Geneva
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Abu Ghraib, at http://lawofwar.org/logical_nexus_between_the_decisi.htm (last visited November 18, 2005).
[hereinafter Wallach] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 70].

40

cannot be classified as an international armed conflict and the ICC cannot prosecute those actors
so involved as war criminals under Article 2 of the Geneva Convention.
(b) Attacks such as 9/11 are not internal conflicts under the Geneva Convention,
and therefore, the ICC may not exercise jurisdiction over them under its
internal conflict powers.
Although Common article 3 of the Geneva Convention does not define internal conflicts,
it requires the conflict to occur in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties. 149 One
author argues that this language at least suggests that such a conflict must be internal to one
state. 150 Furthermore, Article 8(f) of the Rome Statute states that paragraph 2(e) 151 “does not
apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts
of violence or other acts of a similar nature. It applies to armed conflicts that take place in the
territory of a State when there is a protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities
and organized armed groups or between such groups.” 152 Terrorist groups similarly situated to al
Qaeda which carry out attacks similar to those that occurred on 9/11 are not engaged in an
internal armed conflict under existing international law. 153
Again, this position is further supported by some in the United States. Jay Bybee,
Assistant Attorney General of the United States, has taken the position that Article 3 of the
149

Wippman supra note 118, at 15-16.
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against the civilian population or such against individual civilians not taking part in hostilities …).

152
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in accompanying notebook at Tab 42] (noting that “the global war on terrorism appears to have highlighted a
category of persons not explicitly regulated by the international law of armed conflict.”).
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Geneva Convention applies only to armed conflicts contained in the territory of one state. 154
Furthermore, he insists that Article 3 fails to “address the gap left by Article 2 for international
armed conflicts that involve a group that operates from multiple locations within multiple
states. 155
To further support the contention that Article 8 does not apply to the 9/11 attacks or the
subsequent “war on terror,” there was not an armed conflict within the United States when the
attacks occurred, nor is there an ongoing conflict within the borders of the United States. Al
Qaeda engaged in a preemptive strike against civilian targets in the United States prior to any
armed conflict or declared “war on terror.” The 9/11 attacks could be considered a sporadic act
of violence. Although the four-part attack was systematically executed and claimed the lives of
thousands of people, it has been the only attack carried out on U.S. soil to date. Article 8(f)
establishes that conflicts not of international character apply only to “armed conflicts that take
place in the territory of a State where there is protracted armed conflict between governmental
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups.” In situations like 9/11 where
there is not a protracted armed conflict within the borders of one nation, the laws of war do not
apply, but rather the anti-terrorism conventions as previously listed above (supra note 56 and
accompanying text) are applicable.156
As pointed out by Burke, the belief that al Qaeda is a network of thousands of Islamic
radicals all pledging allegiance to Osama bin Laden is a misconception. 157 Burke notes that
many radicals have gone to training camps in Afghanistan, but they did not necessarily pledge an
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allegiance to bin Laden or actually agree with his motives. 158 This suggests that al Qaeda may
not be as organized and widespread as popularly believed to be. According to Burke and other
terrorism scholars, al Qaeda is rather a loose-knit organization of like-minded militants who
sometimes agree with a motive of one of the patron figures. 159 Thus, these authors identify
issues that may raise concerns over the ability to classify groups such as al Qaeda as an
organized militia under Article 8(f).
However, other scholars have insisted that Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions apply to
the “war on terror.” One author supporting this position has conceded that “it seems to have
been assumed that non-international conflicts would also be internal conflicts – that they would
be confined to the territory of a single state” during the drafting of Article 3. 160 However, he
still contends that there is no reason Article 3 should not be extended to all conflicts not covered
by Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions. 161 He argues that Article 3 should be read to include
any armed conflict in the territories of states that are parties to the Conventions. 162 Under this
analysis, any attack carried out by members of a terrorist organization within the borders of a
member-state to the Geneva Conventions would be held accountable under international law.
Although a plausible position, there remains a debate as to whether there is support under current
international law to substantiate this position and give Article 3 such a broad application. John
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Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the United States, and Robert Delahunty, Special
Counsel, conceded that the ICTY’s decision in Tadic takes the position that Article 3 is not a
complement to Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions; but rather is a “catch-all that encompasses
all armed conflicts not included in article 2.” 163 However, both Yoo and Delahunty reject this
position on the grounds that the drafters could not have contemplated the application of Article 3
to armed conflicts between a nation-state and a transnational terrorist organization and that
“expanding the scope well beyond the meaning borne by the text is effectively to amend the
Geneva Convention without the approval of the State Parties to the agreement.” 164
There are also other flaws to this approach. For example, to satisfy the requirement that
the conflict be a protracted armed conflict under 8(f) of the Rome Statute it would have to be
assumed that all attacks carried out by terrorist organizations in multiple countries are part of an
ongoing, continuous attack. 165 This would further require the assumption that the attacks are
being carried out by the same terrorist organization and under the orders of its leaders. This
would allow the “myth” of al Qaeda’s strength to determine the breadth of international law and
not the underlying text within the statute itself. Therefore, the ICC should reject this proposition.
Others reject the position that the “war on terror” is not a war under international law on
moral grounds. One author who opposes Yoo and Bybee’s position believes that the United
States must comply with Article 3 of the Geneva Convention until a competent court rules
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See John Yoo & Robert J. Delahunty, Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees,
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otherwise based on the requirements under Article 5 of the Convention. 166 Another author
argues that the position taken by the United States allows it to pick and choose the laws
applicable to the conflict. 167 Still others opposing the viewpoints set forth by the legal advisors
of the Bush administration claim that supporting such an analysis on the “war on terror”
condones torture. 168 Although it seems that the majority of scholars in the United States have
rejected the Bush Administration’s position on the “war on terror” and the status of detainees
captured during the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq 169 , these positions should not be used to
expand the clear language used under the Geneva Conventions, but rather should be used to
identify the shortfall of current international law as applied to armed conflicts. 170 The ICC
should await guidance from the international community as reflected by amendments to current
international law, 171 and should refuse to exercise jurisdiction over combatants in the “war on
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terror” until the international community responds to the gaps left unresolved under international
law. 172
Therefore, those responsible for the attacks such as those of September 11, 2001 should
not be tried as war criminals, even though such attacks constitute several of the enumerated
crimes under Article 8. The threshold that must be surpassed before any person may be tried as a
war criminal is the establishment of a recognized war. Although the “war on terror” spans
several continents, it is not currently recognized by international law. Further, it must also be
established that an internal armed conflict is being fought against “organized armed groups”
operating within the confines of a single state. This is a very difficult threshold to reach without
the explicit recognition of the “war on terror” under international law and the inability to reach a
consensus on the definition of terrorism. Thus, members of “global” terrorist groups should not
be held accountable as war criminals until the international community explicitly recognizes the
“war on terror” under international law.
(c) Applying the definition “Terrorism: The peacetime equivalent of a war crime”
has too many identified problems that prevent it from being an effective
alternative to the ICC’s war crimes jurisdiction.
As previously stated, Alex Schmid’s definition of “terrorism as a peacetime equivalent of
a war crime” has received increased attention since the Indian Supreme Court referenced to it in
Singh v. Bihar (supra note 66 and accompanying text). However, there has not been an
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international consensus on the adoption of such a definition so its application by an international
court could raise concerns. 173 Nevertheless, defining terrorism as the peacetime equivalent of
war crimes would fill gaps left by international laws of war as well as those left by the antiterrorism conventions. 174 It would allow courts to charge perpetrators of crimes not previously
covered by these conventions by lowering the threshold amount of armed conflict that is
required.
However, significant drawbacks have been identified to such an approach. First, it is
difficult to distinguish between civilians and members of a terrorist organizations involved in a
conflict. Although the 1949 Geneva Convention required lawful combatants to identify
themselves by a distinct sign, the 1977 Protocol overrode this requirement in the face of modern
guerilla warfare. 175 Professor Scharf finds that if the laws of war are stretched to this limit, then
members of terrorist organizations can take advantage of being classified as lawful combatants
under less stringent standards of Protocol I. 176 However, others have argued that simply labeling
attacks as acts of war does not legitimize the actor or imply that the act was lawful. 177
Scharf has noted other drawbacks to defining terrorism as the peacetime equivalent of
war crimes. For example, terrorists could rely on “combatant’s privilege” which exempts
combatants from liability for certain common crimes. Thus, the killing of police officers,
173
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military members, or other government personnel would not be prosecutable offenses, nor would
the kidnapping of military or government personnel. 178 Other potential problems with such an
approach to terrorism include: legitimizing political assassinations, entitling terrorists to POW
status, and granting ability to claim the defense of superior orders. 179 Finally, the delegates to
the Rome Conference explicitly rejected the inclusion of terrorism in the Rome Statute because
of the inability to reach a consensus agreement on the definition. Application of Schmid’s
definition would override these concerns without the explicit acceptance from the international
community. Therefore, this approach may present more problems than it solves, and may
actually become a hindrance in the “war on terror.” Thus, the ICC should not attempt to
prosecute members of terrorist organizations operating on an international level until
international law recognizes the “war on terror.”

3. Freedom Fighters and internal terrorist organizations may be the exception to the
general rule that terrorist organizations cannot be tried as war criminals.
Although the push for the exclusion of “Freedom Fighters” has been the most notable
obstacle in reaching an internationally acceptable definition for terrorism, members of these
groups can be tried by the ICC as war criminals if they operate within a single territory and
become involved in a declared war against a government. Freedom fighters and “internal”
terrorist organizations operating against a single government will be treated differently than
terrorist organizations operating on an international scale because the Geneva Convention
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recognizes internal conflicts among such groups. 180 Applying the same analysis as provided for
state actors, it is possible that these organizations are involved in an internal armed conflict.
Therefore, members of these groups may be tried as war criminals if they violate the
international laws of war.
An example of an isolated conflict is that which is occurring between Russia and
Chechen guerillas. Chechen rebels have carried out attacks in response to what they call
“genocide against the Chechen people.” 181 However, to retaliate for these “crimes” committed
by Russian troops, Chechen rebels have directed attacks against Russian and Chechen
civilians. 182 Although the ends of the rebels’ goals may be legitimate (independence from
Russia), the means employed to accomplish such goals (conducting attacks against civilians)
are not. As the ICC can prosecute government actors committing terrorist attacks against
civilians during an armed conflict, it will also have the ability to prosecute “freedom fighters”
under the same rationale. Applying the same element-by-element analysis as was provided for
state terrorists, it is clear that the ICC will have jurisdiction to prosecute non-state actors engaged
in a civil war when attacks against a civilian population are carried out.
(a) Is there an ongoing armed conflict recognized by international law?
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2005). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 35]. However, to demonstrate the applicability of the laws
of war to rebel groups, this subsection will only focus on the Chechen guerillas.
182

For a list of events that have occurred throughout the history of the Russia-Chechnya conflict, see David Johnson
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As previously stated, international law recognizes two types of armed conflict: (1)
international and (2) internal. The conflict between Russia and the Chechen rebels can be
classified as an internal conflict. An internal conflict under the Geneva Convention includes
civil wars. 183 The conflict between the rebels and the Russian military can be described as a
civil war because the Chechen rebels are fighting for their independence. Therefore, the first
element of Article 8 is satisfied.
(b) Is there a relationship between the armed conflict and the attack?
The second element requires a nexus between the armed conflict and the attacks. The
Chechen rebels have carried out attacks against civilians to further their cause. For example, on
October 23, 2002, Chechen rebels seized a Russian Theater, taking over 700 hostages, in a
demand to have Russian troops withdraw from Chechnya. 184 The siege continued for over two
days until the Russian military employed the use of an “unidentified knock-out gas,” resulting in
the death of all of the insurgents and 130 of the hostages. 185 This siege was directly related to
the conflict between Russia and Chechnya. Therefore, a nexus between the armed conflict and
the attacks exists.
(c) Was there a violation of the laws of war?
Article 3 of the Geneva Convention provides for protection of civilians not participating
in the conflict. Therefore, any attack against a civilian population, whether it is carried out by
government forces or forces opposing government rule, will constitute a war crime. Thus, any
attacks conducted by the Chechen rebels against Russian or Chechen civilians violates the
183
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Geneva Conventions, and the rebel leaders ordering such attacks could be charged under Article
8 of the Rome Statute.
However, some other attacks carried out by the Chechen rebels would be decriminalized
if this conflict were recognized by international law. 186 These rebels would then have the ability
to claim combatant status and privileges, so attacks carried out against government forces, such
as the attack in Nalchik against police and government facilities, will be legitimized.

B. Crimes Against Humanity
Even though there is no international definition of terrorism to date, this should not
prevent the ICC from exercising jurisdiction over some terrorist acts that constitute crimes
against humanity. Principle I of the International Law recognized in the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal should be recognized by the ICC. 187 Under Principle I, any person in
violation of a crime against humanity can be tried by the international tribunal and held
responsible for his or her acts. Furthermore, during the creation of the ICC, delegates and legal
scholars assisting in the creation of the court believed that a definition of terrorism was
unnecessary because these crimes would be covered under Article 7 jurisdiction. 188
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Article 7 of the Rome Statute governs the Court’s jurisdiction to hear cases involving
crimes against humanity. 189 This article states:

For the purpose of this Statute, "crime against humanity" means any of the following acts
when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population, with knowledge of the attack:
(a)

Murder;

(b)

Extermination;

(c)

Enslavement;

(d)

Deportation or forcible transfer of population;

(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of
fundamental rules of international law;
(f)

Torture;

(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial,
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds
that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection
with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court;
(i)

Enforced disappearance of persons;

(j)

The crime of apartheid;

(k)

Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. 190
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A with the war crimes analysis, in determining whether a terrorist act falls within
the ICC’s Article 7 jurisdiction, it is necessary to make a factual analysis on a case-bycase basis to determine whether the elements are satisfied.

1. Applicability of Article 7 To Terrorist Acts Carried Out By State Actors
The ICC will have jurisdiction to hear terrorist acts committed by regimes because their
use of force violates human rights, and therefore can be classified as a crime against humanity.
The Rome Statute authorizes the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over any person, including
government leaders, when they become involved in an egregious act committed against a civilian
population.
(a) Saddam Hussein’s Attack Against the Kurdish Community is an Example of A
Terrorist Act Committed By a State That Constitutes A Crime Against
Humanity. 191
During Saddam Hussein’s reign in Iraq, he committed several crimes against humanity.
One such violation was the Al-Anfal campaign. This campaign began in 1986 and lasted until
1989 and was directed at the Kurdish community in Iraq. Saddam’s regime used firing squads,
mass deportation, rockets fired from helicopters, and chemical weapons. As a result of these
attacks 1,274 Kurdish villages were eliminated and approximately 182,000 Kurds were killed.
Applying the elements of the Rome Statute, this campaign clearly constitutes a crime against
humanity. 192
(i) Was there an attack?
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Under the Rome Statute, the first element requires that there be an attack. Article 7(2)(a)
defines an “attack directed against any civilian population” as a course of conduct involving the
multiple commissions of acts referred to in paragraph 1 [fn: supra note 153] against any civilian
population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or organizational policy to commit such
attack.” The Al-Anfal campaign clearly constituted such an attack. The government ordered its
military to carry out strikes against the Kurdish community resulting in the deaths of an
estimated 182,000 people. These attacks were carried out without any legal basis or military
necessity. Therefore, these attacks can easily be described as murdering innocent civilians. The
attacks could also be classified as a persecution against an identifiable group of people under Art.
7(1)(h) because the government targeted only the Kurdish citizens. Thus, the first element is
easily satisfied.
(ii) Were the Acts of the Iraqi Government Part of the Attack?
The second element requires that the perpetrator be a part of the attack. To demonstrate
that the perpetrators’ acts were part of the attack, it must be shown that the accused performed
either an action or an omission that aided in the attacks. 193 In this campaign, the government
supported and carried out the attacks and, therefore, was part of the attack. As a result, Saddam
Hussein and his proxies carrying out the attacks were ‘part of the attack.’ Thus, the second
element is satisfied.
(iii) Was the Attack Directed Against Any Civilian Population?
The third element requires that the attack be directed against a civilian population. The
purpose of this element is to prevent attacks on military personnel during armed conflicts from
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being classified as crimes against humanity. 194 As a result of this exclusion, the court is able to
impose harsher penalties against perpetrators of these crimes, and civilians are entitled to greater
protections during wartime. 195
Although Saddam has claimed that these attacks were used to suppress uprisings against
his regime, the government indiscriminately killed Kurdish citizens. It engaged in military
attacks directed against all Kurdish citizens, whether they were members of a militant group or
not. This is the type of attack that Article 7 of the Rome Statute is aimed to protect against.
Furthermore, the fact that these attacks were directed against Iraqi citizens is irrelevant.
The Statute protects all civilians, regardless of their citizenship. 196 Attacks carried out by a
government, which are directed against any civilian population, satisfy the third element.
(iv) Were the Attacks Widespread and Systematic?
Like statutes of prior international tribunals, the Rome Statute fails to define what
constitutes a widespread and systematic attack. Because of this lack of a definition, prior
tribunals have had difficulty defining the scope of these terms. Despite this difficulty, previous
courts have asserted that widespread at least requires the attack be directed against multiple
victims. 197 However, the ICTY gave indications that an individual carrying out an attack on a
single victim can be prosecuted for a crime against humanity if the act was carried out in
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furtherance of a larger plan or policy. 198 Further, the term systematic requires that there be a
high degree of planning and orchestration. 199
Incorporating both requirements set forth by each respective court, it is clear that these
crimes committed by Hussein’s regime constitute a widespread attack under the Rome Statute.
The attack clearly can be described as an attack against multiple victims, as more than 100,000
people were killed. These attacks were also a part of a larger plan because Saddam was
systematically wiping out Kurdish villages in a strategic attempt to eliminate the Kurdish
population. 200
The attacks can also be described as a systematic attack on the Kurdish population.
Although the term systematic is also left undefined by the Rome Statute, it has been referred to
as “repeated attacks as part of a preconceived plan.” 201 The Al Anfal campaign clearly satisfies
this requirement. Saddam ordered the continued bombardment of Kurdish villages, the forced
transfer of the Kurdish population, imprisonment, and many other enumerated crimes under the
Rome Statute. Therefore, the requirement that the attacks be widespread and systematic is easily
satisfied.
(v)

Did Saddam Hussein Have the Requisite Mens Rea?

The final element requires that the perpetrator have knowledge that the acts are part of a
larger plan. 202 Although one author believes a plain reading of the statute could contain some
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ambiguity -- that the knowledge requirement could mean that the perpetrator must know that the
conduct “(1) is a crime itself or (2) is a prohibited act which is part of a widespread or systematic
attack on a civilian population” 203 -- this element is clearly satisfied. In October 2005, Saddam
Hussein admitted to ordering the Anfal campaign. This establishes not only that he had
knowledge of the attacks but also that he was directly responsible for the assault on a civilian
population.
In conclusion, terrorist acts committed by a government directed towards a civilian
population amount to crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute. Although the Anfal
campaign may be an extreme example of crimes against civilians, the ICC has jurisdiction over
any such attack carried out by a government directed toward a civilian population. As stated
earlier, even a lesser crime carried out by a government can constitute a crime against humanity
if it is part of a larger-scaled attack.
However, without a definition of terrorism, the ICC may face controversy if trying
members of a regime as state terrorists. Like the term terrorism, the definition of state terrorism
is subjective. Acts carried out by a government during a war may be criticized by those
opposing it and characterized as crimes against humanity. However, those who support the war
will defend the acts as being a necessary and proper strategy of war. 204
2. Applicability of Article 7 to Non-State actors
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On September 11, 2001, 205 nineteen men of Middle Eastern decent boarded four separate
aircraft and carried out attacks on the two World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon, while
the fourth airplane failed in its attempt to strike the White House. 206 The 9/11 Commission
reported that “these attackers turned the hijacked planes into the largest suicide bombs in
history.” 207 These attacks clearly amount to a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute
and therefore acts of this type would fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC.
(a) Was there an attack?
To apply the first element, that there must be an attack, it is essential to define an attack.
As shown above (supra note 188 and accompanying text), Article 7 enumerates eleven separate
acts that constitute an attack under the statute and thus fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC. 208
The first enumerated act is murder. Clearly, the acts carried out on September 11, 2001 would
satisfy this element. Even assuming that the extremists were engaged in a recognizable war
against the United States, the attack was directed at the civilian population, and therefore, would
be unjustified. 209 Thus, the first element is satisfied.
(b) Were the acts of the perpetrators part of the attack?
The second element, that the acts of the perpetrator be part of the attack, is more difficult
to analyze. To demonstrate that the perpetrators’ acts were part of the attack, it must be shown
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that the accused performed either an action or omission that aided in the attacks. 210 Those who
carried out the September 11 attacks did not survive. However, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the
“principle architect of the 9/11 attacks” according to the 9/11 Commission report, would satisfy
the second element. 211 His detailed planning and instructions clearly are part of the attack.
Similarly, many other leaders of the al-Qaeda organization would also satisfy this element
because they assisted in the preparation and directly financed the attacks. The difficulty arises in
determining the entire scope of persons involved in such an attack. Should those who generally
helped finance a terrorist organization, which in turn carried out a deplorable act, be held
accountable for these crimes against humanity? Clearly, monetary support is necessary to help
these terrorists accomplish their goals, but it will be difficult to prove specific donations were
used to finance particular attacks. Without sweeping language condemning all persons
contributing to a terrorist organization, the ICC will probably not have jurisdiction to prosecute
financial supporters of terrorist organizations unless the funds can be directly traced to the
specific attack. Therefore, individual nations will have to exercise jurisdiction over those who
finance terrorist organizations. 212
(c) Were the attacks directed against a civilian population?
The third element, that the attack is directed against a civilian population, is not as clear
as it seems on its face. As shown above, this element was established to prevent the labeling of
attacks on military personnel as crimes against humanity. Clearly, the attack on the World Trade
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Center would satisfy this element. However, it is arguable that the attack on the Pentagon was
directed not towards the civilian population, but rather was aimed at disrupting the United States
military. 213 Therefore, a question arises as to the definition of civilian. Is a member of the
military ever considered a civilian under the Rome Statute? This is a question that needs to be
addressed when determining the scope of the ICC jurisdiction under the current law. Under the
current language of the Statute, it seems that any attack on military personnel is not classified as
a crime against humanity.
(d) Were the attacks widespread and systematic?
The fourth element, that the attack be widespread or systematic, is easily satisfied when
examining the 9/11 attacks. The assault used four aircraft targeting four separate buildings 214
and killed thousands of people, showing that it was a widespread attack. Furthermore, the
preconceived planning demonstrates that it was also systematic in its execution. Conversely,
though, there are many perpetrators who carry out attacks on their own volition, without the
support or direction of private organizations. The “lone-wolf” terrorist act might be part of a
widespread attack on a certain population, 215 but many of these acts may not be classified as
systematic. Therefore, the ICC will be unable to exercise jurisdiction over the “lone wolf”
terrorist and individual nations will again have to exercise its jurisdiction over these actors.
(e) Did the perpetrators have the requisite mens rea?
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The last factor requires the perpetrator to have the requisite mens rea. This requires that
the perpetrator have knowledge that the underlying offense is part of a larger policy or plan.
Again, perpetrators involved in the attacks on 9/11 would satisfy this element. Osama bin Laden
and his organization declared war against the United States. 216 The attack was obviously part of
a larger plan to wreak havoc on the civilian population of the United States as well as attempt to
show weaknesses in the government. Therefore, future terrorist leaders, such as bin Laden and
Sheikh Mohammed, would satisfy the mens rea element and could be tried for committing
crimes against humanity under ICC jurisdiction.

IV. CONCLUSION
Although the International Criminal Court delegates elected to eliminate the crime of
terrorism from the Rome Statute during the creation of the Court, this did not eliminate the
possibility of the Court’s exercising jurisdiction over all such acts. However, because of the lack
of a definition and explicit jurisdiction over such acts, the ability of the Court to prosecute
persons involved in terrorist acts will be limited.
Under the Rome Statute, the ICC has jurisdiction over crimes that amount to (1)
genocide, (2) crimes against humanity, or (3) war crimes. Therefore, if the act carried out by a
terrorist organization amounts to one of these enumerated crimes, the Court has jurisdiction to
prosecute such actors. Before determining whether the Court can exercise its jurisdiction, it is
first necessary to define the actor. Terrorists can be divided into two main categories: (1) state
actors and (2) non-state actors. This distinction is relevant because it will determine the breadth
of the Court’s jurisdiction and for which crimes the Court may prosecute such actors.
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The Court has the authority to charge governments engaged in state terrorism with crimes
against humanity as well as war crimes. If a State engages in terrorist activity during wartime in
violation of the Geneva Conventions, or in other inhumane acts as enumerated under Article 8
of the Rome Statute, the ICC has the ability to charge the government and its proxies with war
crimes. However, the key inquiry into whether a war crime has been committed by a state actor
is whether the state is engaged in an armed conflict. The Geneva Conventions provide two
scenarios which amount to an armed conflict: (1) international armed conflict or (2) internal
armed conflicts. Before a state can be charged with a war crime, it is imperative to establish that
an armed conflict was ongoing at the time of the act.
If a state engages in inhumane treatment of its citizens or citizens of another state,
regardless of whether or not the state is engaged in war, the Court has the ability to charge the
acting state with violating crimes against humanity. Thus government actors and their proxies
can be prosecuted for carrying out inhumane attacks on civilian populations under Article 7 of
the Rome Statute.
The ICC’s jurisdiction over non-state actors will be much more limited. The inability to
establish an internationally acceptable definition of terrorism will have more drastic impact on
prosecution of non-state terrorists. The ICC will have the authority to exercise jurisdiction over
non-state actors only in situations where the act is so inhumane that it violates the international
humanitarian laws. However, it must be established that the act was widespread and systematic
before the ICC can exercise such jurisdiction. Therefore, single acts carried out by “lone-wolf”
terrorists will be outside the realm of the ICC jurisdiction.
Furthermore, even though the international community has declared “war on terrorism,”
this is not a conventional war as understood by the international community and is outside the
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scope of the Geneva Convention and the Rome Statute. The war on terror cannot be described as
an international conflict because that type of conflict encompasses only nation-states. The war
on terror cannot be described as an internal conflict because most terrorist organizations operate
from multiple locations in multiple countries. Therefore, it cannot be said that the terrorist
attacks are isolated to one nation. Before the ICC has the ability to prosecute members of
terrorist organizations for war crimes, the international community must include the “war on
terror” as a recognized war under existing international law.
The exception to the different treatment of non-state actors for war crimes for is the
revolutionary groups or “freedom fighters.” If these groups engage in a crime that constitutes
those acts enumerated under the Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute, the Court will have
the ability to try those persons for war crimes. The reason that these groups are treated
differently from other terrorist groups is the fact that most revolutionary groups are involved in
an armed conflict against a single country and its government. Therefore, revolutionary groups
can be considered to be engaged in an internal conflict and are subject to ICC jurisdiction.
Thus, in determining the scope of the ICC’s jurisdiction, it is imperative to understand
what type of terrorist group performed the act. Each group (state, non-state, and revolutionary)
will be treated differently under existing international law. In conclusion, the ICC will have
jurisdiction over members of terrorist organizations, but its jurisdiction will be limited depending
on the actor and the type of act.
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